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ABSTRACT 
The decentralization of budget decisions from the central office to the schoolhouse has emerged 
as a system-changing strategy to give principals the flexibility to allocate their resources to areas 
most likely to improve educational outcomes (Snow & Williamson, 2015).  Budget 
decentralization is viewed as a promising reform strategy, especially for low-performing schools 
that are eager to apply new approaches to meet their students’ needs (Fermanich, Odden, & 
Archibald, 2000). As more districts have announced a transition to decentralized budget 
decision-making, scholars have observed that schools have generally stayed with long-standing 
budget practices and have not embraced autonomy (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 
2012). The theoretical framework of distributed leadership provides insight into why school 
leaders might exercise, or might not exercise, this newfound budget authority. The focus of this 
dissertation was a large urban/suburban school district in Georgia, which has made substantial 
investments in creating school-level budget autonomy. This study sought to understand whether 
 
school leaders exercise budget flexibility when a district has built an environment supportive of 
decentralization by enacting key distributed leadership provisions. Ninety-four traditional public 
schools were included in this study. The budget allocation from the central office and the 
submitted school budget were compared. This study set out to analyze four main budget 
groupings: (a) teachers, (b) paraprofessionals, (c) support personnel, and (d) non personnel. This 
study found that the behavior of principals did significantly differ among elementary, middle, 
and high schools. While the majority of budget changes were not statistically significant, middle 
school principals did significantly reduce their teacher allocation, and elementary principals did 
significantly reduce their non personnel spending. Additionally, low-performing schools 
exercised this autonomy at greater rates than their peers in high performing schools. Finally, the 
amount of time operating in a decentralized budget environment did not lead to a statistically 
significant increase in the exercise of budget autonomy. This insight into the degree to which 
educational leaders exercise budget autonomy can inform the decentralization efforts that are 
currently underway in district offices across the country.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Budget Autonomy, Decentralization, Distribution Leadership, School-Based 
Management, K-12 
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CHAPTER 1 
BUDGET AUTONOMY IN A DECENTRALIZED SCHOOL SYSTEM 
 In an effort to improve student achievement, some policymakers and districts have sought 
to decentralize large school system bureaucracies to empower local leaders (Bjork & Blase, 
2009). Although decentralization can take many forms, it is broadly defined as the transfer of 
decision-making from centralized leadership to lower operating units, typically in very large 
organizations (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg, 2013). Decentralization 
initiatives are becoming more popular because they hold substantial promise to inspire leaders to 
take greater control of their school's educational program (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Ouchi, 2006; 
Steinberg, 2013). School systems in cities such as Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles, 
Boston, and many others have applied aspects of this reform in an attempt to make their systems 
more responsive to the unique needs of their diverse communities (Steinberg, 2014).  
The underlying rationale for the growth of decentralization as a district reform strategy is 
twofold: to improve decision-making and to increase accountability. Some leaders argue for 
decision-making that is closer to student activity, so that it will be more responsive and more 
effective (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Second, leaders contend accountability can be improved 
when local managers have control over resources, so that they can achieve their goals as they 
best see fit (Snow & Williamson, 2015).  
Overview of decentralization. 
In the context of school districts, decentralization is generally applied to three main 
organizational dimensions: personnel, curriculum, and budget. Decentralization in personnel 
management allows the principal more flexibility in staff hiring decisions (Ouchi, 2006). 
Curriculum decentralization permits more local control over the content being taught and the 
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instructional tools used to deliver that content (Ouchi, 2006).  Finally, budget decentralization 
provides the principal with control over how resources are utilized to meet the school’s 
objectives (Ouchi, 2006). 
Of these three types of decentralization, budget autonomy is foundational and therefore 
the most commonly used strategy in decentralization initiatives (Ouchi, 2006; Snow & 
Williamson, 2015). Steinberg (2014) noted that “‘true decentralization’ requires budgetary 
control to be given to each school otherwise the ability of schools to control personnel or 
curriculum is substantially limited” (p.3). Some policymakers emphasize budget autonomy 
because of the belief that school site leaders may be best positioned to allocate scarce resources 
to meet the needs of their unique student demographics (Boudreaux, 2017).   
Despite an increase in the frequency of decentralization policies as a school reform 
strategy, most aspects of decentralization provisions remain unimplemented (Goertz & Stiefel, 
1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). Many scholars note that decentralization policies, and more 
specifically budgeting policies, have not yielded different decisions at the local level (Bjork & 
Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012).  The common observation by scholars is that schools have 
generally stayed with long-standing budget practice and have not embraced the opportunity of 
budget autonomy (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012).  
This study seeks to ascertain whether school leaders will exercise budget flexibility when 
a district supports its decentralization initiative by investing in training and issuing a formalized 
policy. Moreover, this study will investigate whether budget autonomy is affected by a school’s 
level of student performance and the time needed to implement reforms.  
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A distributed leadership perspective of decentralization. 
Although principals have the opportunity to exercise all sorts of flexibility in a 
decentralized environment, “there is little research that examines the role that principals play” 
when they are offered this additional budget autonomy (Mayer, Donaldson, LeChasseur, Welton, 
& Cobb, 2013, p. 726). To better understand why some principals may choose not to exercise 
this additional decision-making authority, it is useful to apply the theoretical framework of 
distributed leadership. Distributed leadership offers a framework for understanding the key 
attributes required for those outside the traditional leadership structure to exercise decision-
making (Harris, 2013). Two key structures that are essential for a distributed leadership 
environment are an explicit policy that defines the roles of leaders and appropriate training for 
school-based personnel now assuming new decision-making authority (Harris, 2013; Honig & 
Rainey, 2012).  
While distributed leadership theory is often used to explain the relationship between 
principal and teacher (Hairon & Goh, 2015), the same reporting relationship and power dynamic 
exists between the central office and the school site (Mayer, Donaldson, LeChasseur, Welton, & 
Cobb, 2013). Distributed leadership is a prominent contemporary leadership theory in education 
because it provides context to the relationship between those who have had historical 
responsibility for a set of decisions and newly empowered decision-makers (Hairon & Goh, 
2015). From a distributed perspective, leadership is not just the function of one particular group 
to another in a school district, but rather a set of activities leaders at all levels engage in with 
others to achieve a specific task such as school reform (Mayer et al., 2013). By focusing on 
leadership as an activity and not a particular position, the definition of leadership from Mayer et 
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al. (2013) permits a broader application of distributed leadership to include all parts of the 
organization.   
An analysis of a district’s experience with decentralization.  
This study will take place in the state of Georgia as it provides a unique example where 
the policy levers are in place to support distributed leadership which may lead to the exercise of 
budget autonomy. Policymakers in Georgia seized on the idea of local control and flexibility and 
passed the Charter System Act of 2007 (Georgia Department of Education, 2017). A Charter 
System is a school district that has a performance contract with the State Board of Education 
granting freedom from most of the state education code in exchange for a commitment to meet 
firm accountability targets (Georgia Department of Education, 2017). Although individual 
districts in other states have experimented with various decentralization reforms, a structured 
commitment to decentralization like the Charter System Act is unique to Georgia (Badertscher, 
2013). In fact, Georgia is currently the only state that provides systematic governance flexibility 
options to entire school districts (Kramer, Lane, & Tanner, 2017). 
To investigate the impact of decentralization on principal behavior, it will be useful to 
investigate one Georgia district in detail that has formalized a Charter System contract. This 
district will be given a pseudonym, Spring Valley County Schools (SVCS). In 2012, the SVCS 
board of education entered into a contract with the State to become a charter system1. SVCS, an 
urban/suburban district serves over 96,000 students, has implemented budget decentralization 
and has embraced the key attributes of distributed leadership through policy structure and 
training investments. By joining the charter system, SVCS made an explicit commitment to 
 
1 I did not include specific references to certain data in order to preserve the school district’s anonymity. 
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budget autonomy and formally moved budgetary decision-making from the central office to the 
school site. 
Additionally, SVCS has invested heavily in training and professional development to 
promote distributed leadership to school site leaders. In addition to published training materials, 
each principal participated in a series of governance and resource allocation training sessions by 
a Boston-based consulting firm (Woo, 2012). Finally, SVCS has demonstrated a commitment to 
financial transparency which permits a school-level analysis of budget decisions.  
Based on publicly-available resource allocation and budget data, this study will analyze 
the actual execution of budget autonomy, which has characterized current district 
decentralization efforts. SVCS will be the focus of this analysis. While this study does not seek 
to evaluate the impact of decentralization on student learning outcomes, it aims to provide 
policymakers and district leaders’ insight into one district’s experience with budget 
decentralization in an environment where the distribution of leadership has been a strategic focus 
of district reform. While in some cases the principal may agree with the standard budget 
prescribed by the district finance office, decentralization initiatives are predicated on the idea 
that each school has a unique set of needs based on unique student populations (Honig, 2012). 
This study will not assess the quality of the decision-making of the principal, but rather seeks to 
understand whether a policy of budget flexibility leads to a change in school-level budget 
decisions, which is the explicit purpose of the reform.  
This study will investigate whether a decentralization effort leads to the exercise of 
budget flexibility at the school level in a distributed leadership environment. Rather than assess 
the success of decentralization by focusing on principals’ perceptions or their stated interest, this 
study will examine the actual exercise of different decisions under these decentralization 
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policies. As a result of its substantial commitment to a distributed leadership environment in both 
policy and practice, SVCS offers a unique opportunity to observe the execution of budget 
autonomy. If the difference between the district-level allocation of school resources and the 
actual school-level budget decisions prove to be statistically significant, then the SVCS case 
would run counter to the research because this decentralization initiative achieved its intended 
purpose of budget autonomy. That insight can inform the implementation decisions of districts 
that are pursuing this reform to better position this initiative for success.   
 Research Questions 
Based on the research of the critical features necessary for the exercise of budget 
autonomy as well as the insight provided by distributed leadership theory, the following research 
questions guided this study:  
RQ1:  To what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility when it is provided in a 
distributed leadership environment? 
RQ2: When provided with budget flexibility in a distributed leadership environment, 
to what extent does the exercise of that autonomy vary by school performance? 
RQ3: When operating in a distributed leadership environment, to what extent are school 
leaders more likely to change their budgets after they have been given budget 
autonomy for multiple years? 
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 Definition of Terms 
Decentralization – In the case of school contexts, decentralization efforts provide 
“principals with greater autonomy over school-based management decisions related to the 
school’s budget, staff development, curriculum, instruction, and schedule” (Steinberg & Cox, 
2017, p. 131). Decentralization refers to policies enacted by school boards to push decision-
making to local school levels.  
Budget autonomy – Action taken at local school level school to customize resource 
allocation to best meet student needs (Steinberg & Cox, 2017). School-based budgeting is 
increased control over budgets at the local-level where school-level staff alter resource 
allocations based on their local perspective (Stiefel, Schwartz, Portas, & Kim, 2003). 
Distributed leadership –An approach to management where governance tasks are 
assigned both formally and informally “across multiple leaders in a school, including principals, 
assistant principals, curriculum specialists, reading or Title I teachers, and classroom teachers” 
(Spillane, Halverson, & Diamond, 2001, p. 25).  
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) – The CAFR is a budget reporting 
document that districts can choose to publish that goes beyond the minimum requirements of 
generally accepted accounting principles. These comprehensive annual financial reports are 
evidence of full disclosure and a commitment to ensure all stakeholders have a common 
understanding of district practice (Government Finance Officers Association, 2018). 
 Significance of Study 
Decentralizing budget decisions from the central office to the schoolhouse has emerged 
as a system-changing strategy to give principals the flexibility to allocate their resources to 
strategies most likely to improve educational outcomes (Snow & Williamson, 2015).  Despite an 
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increase in the frequency of decentralization policies as a school reform strategy, most aspects of 
decentralization provisions remain unimplemented (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 
2012). Many scholars note that decentralization policies, and more specifically budgeting 
policies, have not yielded different decisions at the local level (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & 
Rainey, 2012).   
If districts continue to implement a reform initiative that has no impact on behavior, it 
can place a tremendous strain on an organization. Development and management of new 
processes can consume significant amounts of school staffs’ time in ways that may distract from 
the focus on teaching, which can then negatively impact learning (Honig & Rainey, 2012). 
Poorly executed decentralization can have “deleterious effects, exhausting limited energy and 
goodwill in futile exercises” (David, 1995, p. 8).  
This study will fill a gap in the literature by investigating whether a decentralization 
effort leads to the exercise of budget flexibility at the school level. This study does not seek to 
assign value to the impact of decentralization on student outcomes; rather it will provide 
policymakers and district leaders’ insight into one district’s experience with budget 
decentralization in an environment where great care had been taken to build an environment that 
incorporates the key attributes of distributed leadership. If the exercise of budget autonomy can 
be found in a district that embraces distributed leadership, that insight can inform the 
implementation in districts who are considering this reform.   
 Review of the Literature 
Budget decentralization is viewed as a promising reform strategy, especially for low-
performing schools that are eager to apply new approaches to meet their students’ needs 
(Fermanich et al., 2000). The literature of decentralization of authority paints a picture of a 
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reform strategy that had its success limited by the lack of execution at the school level (Goertz & 
Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). The purpose of this study is to understand the degree to 
which schools permitted budget flexibility and to provide insight into the viability of budget 
decentralization as a reform strategy. This literature review will first consider the history of 
school-based decision making broadly and autonomous budgeting in particular. This review will 
conclude with an examination of the theoretical framework of distributed leadership and the 
potential insight that this conceptual lens will provide into the exercise of budget autonomy.  
 Overview of decentralization. 
Although decentralization can take many forms, it is broadly defined as the transfer of 
decision-making from centralized leadership to lower operating units, typically in very large 
organizations (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg, 2013). In the context of schools, 
the specific structure and substance of decentralization approaches vary, but the guiding belief 
among advocates is that decentralization can increase the effectiveness of schools by placing 
decision-making closest to the students (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998). This flexibility is designed to 
enable principals to allocate resources towards opportunities for their students that would not be 
possible in an environment without autonomy. There are several examples of how 
decentralization could be employed at the school including more flexible staffing ratios, hiring 
teachers from non-traditional backgrounds, and creative scheduling (Levenson, 2012).  
School decentralization reform focused on three key organizational levers: personnel, 
curriculum, and budget. First, decentralization in personnel management allows the principal 
more flexibility in staff hiring decisions (Ouchi, 2006). Second, curriculum decentralization 
permits more local control over the content being taught and the instructional tools used to 
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deliver that content (Ouchi, 2006).  Thirdly, budget decentralization provides the principal with 
control over how resources are allocated in the school (Ouchi, 2006). 
Budget autonomy is the most essential and most commonly used strategy in district 
reform because resource allocation touches almost every decision made in the school house 
(Ouchi, 2006; Snow & Williamson, 2015). As Steinberg (2014) noted, decentralization requires 
budgetary control to be given to each school otherwise the ability of schools to control personnel 
or curriculum is substantially limited. Resource allocation is key to enabling leaders to enact 
school reform which has led to budget autonomy becoming the most common and preferred 
aspect of decentralization (Ouchi, 2006). Additionally, some policymakers are drawn to budget 
autonomy because of the belief that school site leaders may be best positioned to allocate scarce 
resources to lend tailored educational support to their unique student population (Boudreaux, 
2017).   
Current model of school budgeting. 
Traditional school budgets are driven centrally through administrative formulas that are 
static and do not necessarily reflect the implicit and explicit challenges and opportunities of 
increasingly diverse schools (Coffin & Cooper, 2018). School districts generally build their 
budgets based on allocations that are made based on simple enrollment projections, not the 
informed understanding of student needs (Coffin & Cooper, 2018). While school finance systems 
across the country may vary, most allocate the vast majority of funding based on simple 
enrollment calculations to ease in the management of large, complex school district budgets 
(Snow & Williamson, 2015). For example, systems may have a general ratio that for every 25 
students, a teacher is added to a budget and for every 350 students, funding for an assistant 
principal position is then allocated (Curtis, Sinclair, & Malen, 2014).  As a result, more than 95% 
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of school-assigned resources are already slotted into positions with no local input involved 
(Steinberg, 2014).  
A standard allocation for all schools implies that central office leaders who create 
budgets are best equipped to build a budget for schools and that schools should allocate 
resources the same (Steinberg, 2014). Standard allocations may allow for ease of district 
financial management, but it also may constrain principal behavior. In this type of traditional 
environment, teachers and school leaders have little autonomy over critical budget allocation 
decisions (Strong & Yoshida, 2014). This pervasive budgeting approach means that some desired 
reforms that require local school customization are not funded because they were not directed 
and administered from the central office (Levenson, 2012).  
Early forms of decentralization: school-based budgeting. 
School-based management is a construct built by district leaders to increase 
accountability, improve administrative efficiency, and ensure stakeholder insight is factored into 
school decision-making (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003). School-based management (SBM) and its 
implementation vehicle, school-based councils, are one of the earliest forms of decentralization 
that dates back to the 1980s (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003). SBM expanded in the 1980s because 
funding increases in the 1970s led to a call for greater accountability (Steinberg, 2014).  
By providing a vehicle for the school community to impact decisions, proponents argued 
that SBM shifts the balance of power from the central office to the school community and 
generates local ownership and commitment (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003). School-based councils 
became the entity that brings decision-makers together and is representative of key stakeholders 
in the school community. Systems began to invest in the establishment of school site councils 
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which became a centerpiece of the school reform agenda beginning in the 1990s (Greenlee, 
2007).   
In practice, however, school-based councils had nominal authority – evidence suggests 
upwards of 95 percent of the budget authority was often determined before dollars were allocated 
to the school (Steinberg, 2014). Scholars suggest that school-based councils’ success was also 
limited by lack of knowledge, lack of influence, and in some cases because they became a citizen 
body that posed political risk to school boards (Snow & Williamson, 2015). 
As a result of the perceived shortcomings of SBM, the most recent iterations of 
decentralization focus on the principal as the locus of control (Steinberg 2014). Federal 
education policy, through Race To The Top in 2010, encouraged states to build policies to 
support local control as well as operate autonomous, non-charter public schools (Steinberg, 
2014). Greenlee (2007) confirmed the outsized role of the principal in driving the agenda of 
school governance councils in his Florida study when he noted that school leaders “deliberately 
employ strategies to represent primarily the interests of the school and its employees” (p. 242). 
The principal serves not only as the gate-keeper of information, but often has a pivotal role in 
selecting or influencing the election of members to the council (Malen, 1994). In the new 
principal focused model, SBM provides an important advisory function; the principal retains the 
role of critical decision-maker.  
Growth of decentralization. 
Decentralization has grown in popularity as district leaders are investigating strategies to 
help low-performing schools better to meet their students’ needs (Fermanich et al., 2000). The 
underlying rationale behind this strategy is twofold. First, pushing decision-making closer to 
those most-impacted by decisions or charged with their implementation will lead to more 
13 
 
effective policies and strategies (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Second, government will be made 
more responsive by providing managers with control over resources so that they can achieve 
their goals as they best see fit (Snow & Williamson, 2015).  
Elected leaders have historically favored centralized systems to bind administrative 
leaders to policy and reduce the risk of shortfalls or misdirected resources (Snow & Williamson, 
2015). Centralized systems have clear lines of authority and are designed to yield predictable 
outcomes. This prevailing wisdom amongst school board leaders was to create larger more 
professionalized agencies that could also generate scale efficiencies (Diem, Sampson, & 
Browning, 2018). 
As centralized systems grew and performance stalled, the response from reform 
advocates was that large, unresponsive bureaucracies are too disconnected from stakeholders at 
the school level to impact the school community (Snow & Williamson, 2015). To address these 
concerns, policymakers were enlisted “to shift power and authority from central office 
administration to school-level leadership” (Diem et al., 2018, p. 1). As part of this trend to 
reinvent government, an important priority was to give school leadership increased control over 
resources so they can achieve the goals as they see fit (Snow & Williamson, 2015). 
The first well-documented school district to reflect this shift in authority occurred in 
Edmonton, Canada, in 1976 (Ouchi, 2006). As a consequence of their success, empowering local 
school sites with authority has developed a substantial following in large school systems that are 
mired in underperformance (Ouchi, 2006). Since 2000, this innovation has been transplanted 
across the sector to districts in Cincinnati, Houston, Seattle, New York City, Los Angeles, and 
Chicago among others (Honig & Rainey, 2012; Miles & Roza, 2006; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg, 
2013).  
14 
 
Challenges of budget decentralization implementation. 
Despite an increase in the frequency of decentralization as a school reform strategy, most 
aspects of decentralization provisions remain unimplemented (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & 
Rainey, 2012). Many scholars note that decentralization policies, and more specifically 
budgeting policies, have not yielded different decisions at the local level (Bjork & Blase, 2009; 
Honig & Rainey, 2012).  The common observation by scholars is that schools have generally 
stayed with long-standing budget practice and have not embraced the opportunity of 
decentralization (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012).  
The literature identifies two main aspects of organizational structure that impact the 
adoption of budget autonomy: an explicit policy that guides leadership’s behavior and the 
training of staff to prepare them to accept this additional responsibility.  
The first criteria for embracing autonomy is the existence of explicit school budget 
authority that specifies policies that define the role of district leaders. Without specific policies, 
district leaders and elected officials can be swayed by a tendency to micromanage and political 
pressures (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Harris (2013) argues that formalizing the leadership 
structure goes a long way to create the conditions for distributed leadership. The reason a 
formalized policy is necessary is to counter the central office’s struggle to relinquish control of 
key local decision-making (Honig & Rainey, 2012; McKenzie & Locke, 2014; Strong & 
Yoshida, 2014). The importance of formalized policy was observed in reviews of 
decentralization efforts in Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles. In those cases, there was a 
common theme that institutional support for site-based decision-making, evidenced by 
formalized policy, is a critical factor in the school’s decision to exercise local budget authority 
(Hughes, 1993; Lauber & Warden, 1999).  
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Scholars agree the other main limitation of decentralization implementation is that 
schools are insufficiently trained to handle the complex challenges associated with local 
management of school budgets (Honig & Rainey, 2012; Lauber & Warden, 1999; Mayer & 
LeChasseur, 2013; Steinberg, 2014). Honig & Rainey (2012) concluded that the capacity 
building of decentralization might be the most relevant impact, especially for school budgeting 
given its complexity. As several reviews of school site-based management research concluded, 
principals, school site council members, and teachers all needed additional professional 
development but rarely received it (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). There is 
congruence in the research that without proper training, implementation of budget autonomy will 
be limited (Stiefel et al., 2003; Wohlstetter, Datnow, & Park, 2008).  
Decentralization as a strategy for low performing schools. 
 As the focus on turning around low performing schools has increased, district–school 
relationship has come under increased scrutiny as a potential leverage point (Mayer et al., 2013). 
There have generally been three models designed to reform this relationship to address chronic 
low-performance: increasing district oversight through intensive intervention, state-level 
takeover of governance, or granting those schools more autonomy to solve their own problems 
(Mayer et al., 2013). Given the poor record of the first two approaches, there is promise in the 
strategy of increasing autonomy (Mayer et al., 2013). 
Limitations of current research. 
Research on budget decentralization tends to focus on stated principal preference, not on 
whether the principals actually exercise the afforded flexibility to impact their school budget 
(Honig, 2012). One example of the current approach is a study of a decentralization reform in 
Chicago Public Schools, known as the Autonomous Management and Performance Schools 
16 
 
(AMPS) program, which investigated school leader’s preference for budget autonomy 
(Steinberg, 2014). The researcher found 82 percent of the schools who were afforded flexibility 
selected the “budget transfers” option, which allowed the school to exercise spending control 
(Steinberg, 2014, p. 11). While the AMPS study demonstrates school leaders’ interest in 
autonomy, the author did not analyze whether their budget decisions actually changed as a result 
of the availability of flexibility. Data limitations were the cited reason why only preference, not 
action was measured (Steinberg & Cox, 2015).  
This lack of observed behavior was noted again in another budget decentralization case 
study in Cordell Place School District in the Pacific Northwest (Fermanich et al., 2000). The 
study did show that outcomes did improve during the period of decentralization, but there is no 
evidence that schools actually utilized this budget authority to drive improvement (Fermanich et 
al., 2000). The common thread in both cases was the researcher’s focus on the stated action of 
the principal and not on the objective action of budget decision-making. This lack of 
investigation of the observable exercise of budget autonomy is a common theme in the research 
(Honig, 2012).   
The distributed leadership conceptual model. 
The study is framed by distributed leadership theory to provide insight into how leaders 
assume additional leadership responsibilities, outside their traditional authority, to contribute to 
the implementation of a reform strategy. The purpose of this section of the literature review is to 
examine the role of distributed leadership on the viability of the execution of decentralized 
budget policies.  
 Distributed leadership theory argues that there are multiple sources of influence within 
any organization (Harris, 2013). The foundation of this theory is the idea that organization 
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success is based on individuals in unstated and informal leadership roles assuming key decision-
making authority (Harris & Spillane, 2008). The literature is guided by the seminal work of 
Spillane’s research which has focused on leadership practice between leaders, followers and their 
unique situations (Harris, 2013; Spillane et al., 2001). 
While there seems to be a lack of universal definition of distributive leadership, a 
working definition common among the literature is the “enacting [of] leadership tasks is often 
distributed across multiple leaders in a school, including principals, assistant principals, 
curriculum specialists, reading or Title I teachers, and classroom teachers” (Spillane et al., 2001, 
p. 25). The concept has evolved from a pragmatic tool to distribute the work of an organization 
to the leadership role of key actors (Tian, Risku, & Collin, 2016). There are a few common 
distributed leadership principles that are consistent with this working definition, most notably it 
requires multiple levels of involvement in decision-making, encompasses both formal and 
informal leaders, and is ultimately concerned with improving leadership practice (Harris & 
Spillane, 2008).  
Distributed leadership theory is often grounded in the relationship between principal and 
teacher (Hairon & Goh, 2015), yet it can also provide insight into the relationship between the 
central office and the school site because the same reporting relationship and power dynamic 
exist (Mayer et al., 2013). This broader application is consistent with Spillane’s original work on 
the topic (Mayrowetz, 2008). From a distributed perspective, leadership is not just the function 
of one particular group to another in a school district, but rather a set of activities leaders at all 
levels engage in with others to achieve a specific task (Mayer et al., 2013). Mayer et al., 
concluded that distributed leadership could be applied when formal leadership is reimagined 
because it provides a more “conceptually accurate depiction of the complex nature of leadership 
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by suggesting that leadership is socially constructed and varies from situation to situation based 
on context” (Mayer et al., 2013, p. 699). 
Before assessing the impact of distributed leadership on the exercise of budget autonomy, 
it is important to understand the elements that are in place in a distributed leadership 
environment. After reviewing over 80 citations to look for common themes in the distributed 
leadership, a team from the University of Gloucestershire identified four variables that indicate 
the presence of distributed leadership (Bennett, Wise, Woods, & Harvey, 2003). These key 
variables are control/autonomy, organizational structure and agency, social and cultural context, 
and source of change (Bennett et al., 2003). Control/autonomy is evidenced by formal policy that 
guides the actions of the organizations. Organizational structure can be demonstrated by changes 
the system has made to support distributed leadership. The social context is important because 
without internal cultural support, it is difficult for distributed leadership to be sustained. Finally, 
the source of change impacts the viability of the move to distributed leadership because it can 
provide enduring influence on senior leaders to sustain the commitment to distributed leadership. 
Taken together, this framework will be useful to demonstrate an organization has distributed 
leadership. 
Applicability of distributed leadership to decentralization. 
Distributed leadership may provide insight into why the implementation of budget 
decentralization has been so limited. It offers a framework for understanding the key attributes 
required for those asked to exercise additional decision-making authority outside their traditional 
leadership roles (Harris, 2013). The leadership and management literature shows that stated 
leaders, by virtue of their formal leadership roles, are important gatekeepers to organization 
decision making and can actively encourage or limit other’s ability to take opportunities to lead 
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innovation or change (Harris, 2013). If a district adopts the key criteria of distributed leadership, 
then one could expect greater degrees of autonomy as formal leaders share their decision-making 
responsibility and schools embrace their new authority (Harris, 2013; Spillane et al., 2001).  
In the proceeding section, Bennett et al. (2003) described a test to identify the existence 
of distributed leadership which can provide insight into the exercise of budget autonomy. 
Distributed leadership, when applied to budget decentralization policies, can give principals the 
freedom and expertise to exercise budget autonomy. While Strong & Yoshida (2014) agreed that 
the principal is an essential actor in distributed leadership, Mayer et al. (2013) provided a 
nuanced perspective that principals require some “protection” from district pressure for 
immediate results in order to give some time for local school control in a decentralized 
environment to flourish (p. 39). In other words, the principal’s success in creating an 
environment that supports local control is not just dependent on their leadership style or 
commitment, but also the level of support from the central office's formal leadership. 
The distributed leadership literature also helps explain why, even if the policy environment is 
right, some actors do not exercise this available flexibility (Honig & Rainey, 2012). The lens of 
distributed leadership explains the preconditions for the success of a decentralization strategy.  
Literature review conclusion. 
While it is clear that district leaders pursue budget decentralization as a strategy to 
improve school outcomes, the rate of adoption at the school-level is consistently lacking in the 
literature (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012).  The literature defines two main 
explanations for this poor record of implementation: lack of formal leadership at the senior levels 
and lack of training at the local level. The support of the leadership is required to ensure an 
autonomous environment is successful (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Greenlee, 2007). Additionally, the 
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exercise of budget autonomy often does not occur because school communities are insufficiently 
trained to handle the complex challenges associated with local management (Honig & Rainey, 
2012; Lauber & Warden, 1999; Mayer & LeChasseur, 2013; Steinberg, 2014).  
The literature of decentralization of authority paints a picture of a reform strategy that 
had its success limited by the lack of execution at the school level (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; 
Honig & Rainey, 2012). The theoretical framework of distributed leadership provides useful 
insight into budget autonomy because it argues that those outside of the traditional authority 
structure will only act on a lever of power if they have the right set of conditions to take 
ownership of that set of decisions (Harris, 2013). Advocates and detractors of budget 
decentralization would benefit from a study that seeks to deepen the understanding of the 
exercise of budget flexibility in an intentionally designed environment that meets the criteria of 
distributed leadership. This insight into the degree to which schools exercise permitted autonomy 
will inform the decentralization implementation efforts that are currently underway. 
Additionally, this insight will aid in planning considerations for districts that are considering 
expanding flexibility as a reform strategy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE EXERCISE OF BUDGET AUTONOMY 
 The purpose of this study was to ascertain whether school principals exercise budget 
flexibility when a district takes care to build an environment supportive of decentralization by 
enacting key distributed leadership provisions. This study also investigated whether schools of 
varying student achievement levels, operating in a distributed leadership environment, exercised 
the ability to customize their budgets beyond the standard district allocation.  
The distributed leadership theoretical framework provides a unique perspective into the 
exercise of budget autonomy because it argues that the right set of conditions must be in place 
for actors to take on non-traditional decision-making roles (Harris, 2013). This study provides 
insight into the exercise of budget flexibility in an environment that meets the criteria of 
distributed leadership. As budget autonomy grows in popularity, this insight will aid in planning 
considerations for districts that are contemplating this type of flexibility as a reform strategy. 
 Research questions. 
This study addresses a gap in the literature by discerning whether a district that has 
created budget autonomy within a distributed leadership environment displays budget changes at 
the school level. Based on the research of the critical features necessary for the exercise of 
autonomy as well as the insight provided by distributed leadership theory, the following research 
questions were created: 
RQ1:  To what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility when it is provided in a 
distributed leadership environment? 
RQ2: When provided with budget flexibility in a distributed leadership environment, 
to what extent does the exercise of that autonomy vary by school performance? 
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RQ3: When operating in a distributed leadership environment, to what extent are school 
leaders more likely to change their budgets after they have been given budget 
autonomy for multiple years? 
 Methodology. 
 This study sought to observe the execution of budget autonomy, which has been a 
shortcoming of current decentralization efforts (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). 
This study uses a quantitative methodology in order to capture whether or not school leaders 
exercise budget autonomy as a reform strategy. This study will evaluate if the reform strategy is 
actually affecting a change in school budgeting.   
This study’s research questions call for a positivist approach that seeks to understand 
behavior through a collection of observable facts by “recording measurements, describing 
phenomena and performing experiments” (Cohen, 1982, p. 47). The data analyses isolated the 
phenomena of school budget autonomy by observing whether school leaders, with the freedom to 
alter their budget, chose to utilize their resources differently than the standard district central 
office allocation. While a qualitative study can provide insight into the thought process of 
principals and other stakeholders in their decision-making process, a quantitative study reveals 
whether budget flexibility was actually executed. The lack of observation of actual behavior 
change has been a shortcoming of the literature. For instance, in past studies examining 
preference and intent principals overwhelmingly indicate a preference for budget autonomy 
(Steinberg & Cox, 2017). Though perceptions of principals have been well-documented, in 
practice, budget autonomy has not led to a change in decision-making (Honig & Rainey, 2012). 
 The first research question, to what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility, was 
answered by comparing the district budget allocations alongside the principal’s budget 
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allocations (or decisions). This approach adds to the current research by recording the actual 
dollar amounts and can be instructive to future decentralization efforts. Research on budget 
decentralization tends to catalog the principal’s declared priority, not whether the principals 
actually exercise the afforded flexibility to impact their school budget (Honig, 2012). One 
example of this tendency was observed by Steinberg (2014) who found that principals supported 
the notion of personal control over their budgets in the Chicago decentralization effort, yet 
absent was an actual analysis of whether or not budget decentralization was exercised. Steinberg 
noted that 82% of the schools who were afforded flexibility selected the “budget transfers” 
option, which allowed the school to exercise spending control (Steinberg, 2014, p. 11). While the 
Chicago study demonstrates a school leader’s interest in autonomy, the author did not analyze 
whether their budget was actually impacted. This gap is commonly cited in Honig & Rainey’s 
(2012) review of the literature on decentralization efforts. 
To address the second research question, “to what extent does the exercise of that 
autonomy vary by school performance?” the College Career-Readiness Performance Index 
(CCRPI) was used to identify a school’s performance level. While simple test scores are one 
gauge of achievement, CCRPI goes a step further by looking at multiple measures to assess 
performance.  The CCRPI is a comprehensive platform that considers school improvement, 
accountability, and communication among educational stakeholders. CCRPI builds on the state 
accountability test known as Georgia Milestones by looking at (a) test score growth and 
achievement, (b) achievement gaps, and (c) readiness (Georgia Department of Education, 2017). 
Readiness focuses on foundational skills, such as literacy, attendance, and enrichment beyond 
the traditional core (Georgia Department of Education, 2017).  As a state-mandated 
accountability system, CCRPI provided reliable rankings for all schools in this study.  
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 This study included low and high achieving schools to compare whether they, on 
average, adopted budget autonomy. Schools in the district were identified by their rank: low 
performing and high performing, separated by the median performance. Median CCRPI scores 
are reported statewide by school grade level: elementary, middle, and high school (Georgia 
Department of Education, 2017). Some of the components of CCRPI vary by school grade level, 
so separating schools by grade level ensured the study was not overly influenced by spending 
allocations or decision from a group of schools with one particular grade level configuration. 
Additionally, by employing the median CCRPI cut score as the classification line, more schools 
were included in the study while still providing objective demarcation.  
Georgia’s state accountability system, as measured by CCRPI, was used to rank school 
performance because the CCRPI is more comprehensive. Other measures of success were 
considered but discarded. For example, two common measures of success are reductions in 
teacher turnover and the ten-point rating system released by GreatSchools.com. Teacher turnover 
was dismissed as an inappropriate measure because this study is focused on principal decision-
making. Additionally, there are a number of variables that impact turnover data because many 
factors lead to attrition, beyond just school leadership and culture (Ingersoll, 2001).  Though 
Great Schools.com is an independent agency, GreatSchools.com was dismissed because CCRPI 
is a more reliable indicator of school performance. GreatSchools.com is a leading nonprofit that 
provides summary ratings of school performance. One challenge with the GreatSchool.com 
rating system is that almost all of its rankings are based on raw test scores for ease of national 
comparisons, which does not allow for local accountability (Strauss, 2017). CCRPI is a state-
regulated tool that has a greater degree of rigor and is subject to oversight by the U.S. 
Department of Education as a matter of law. 
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 This study engaged distributed leadership theory as an analytical framework to provide 
insight into the decision-making process of school principals. Distributed leadership helps 
explain how formal and informal leadership roles contribute to organizational outcomes (Harris 
& Spillane, 2008).  While distributed leadership theory is often used to explain the relationship 
between principal and teacher (Hairon & Goh, 2015), the same reporting relationship and power 
dynamic exist between the central office and the school site (Mayer, Donaldson, LeChasseur, 
Welton, & Cobb, 2013). From a distributed perspective, leadership is not just the function of one 
particular group to another in a school district, but rather a set of activities leaders at all levels 
engage in with others to achieve a specific task (Mayer et al., 2013). The literature on 
distributive leadership argues that newly empowered leaders are more likely to embrace 
autonomy when they are permitted to lead and given the training and support to take on this 
additional body of work (McKenzie & Locke, 2014).  
Validity and reliability. 
Threats to validity and reliability cannot be erased, but there are important steps that can 
reduce their influence over the study findings (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2013). Validity is 
defined as the extent to which a concept is accurately measured in a quantitative study (Cohen et 
al., 2013). The budget allocation from the central office and the submitted school budget were 
compared. These documents were readily available because an annual audit is carried out to 
provide accurate measurements of how resources are allocated by the schools. The question is 
whether changes in budget decisions at the school level correctly indicate the exercise of 
decentralized decision-making.  
 To ensure construct validity, the principal’s actual budget of planned expenditures was 
used.  This is the budget that that was submitted into the district accounting system. Thus the 
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central office’s allocation for the school becomes data set 1 and the school principal’s budget 
becomes data set 2. While the specific motivation for a principal’s decision may or may not be 
an embrace of the decentralization initiative, this final submission will capture whether or not 
principals changed the budget allocations given to them by the central office.  
 Reliability in quantitative research concerns dependability, consistency, and replicability 
over time (Cohen et al., 2013). Dependability assesses whether the processes of a study are 
consistent over time (Cohen et al., 2013). For this study, the data collection and analysis were 
standardized across each school. The budgets were allocated in a consistent fashion by the 
central office according to a published resource guide, and the principals were obligated to 
submit budget reports. Consequently, this study’s collection and reporting processes were 
transparent and dependable. Consistency assesses whether the tools that propose to measure the 
same general construct produce similar findings (Cohen et al., 2013). For this study, consistency 
was established by the school’s allocation guide, which is a public document approved by the 
SVCS school board and is the core of the budgeting process that is applied to each school across 
the district. For research to be replicable, it must be demonstrated that if it were to be carried out 
in a similar context, then the researcher would find similar results (Cohen et al., 2013). 
Replicability exists because one common set of budget allocation formulas were consistently 
applied to each school within the district. The data and formulas are available to other 
researchers. 
 Research Design. 
This study’s methodology, research questions, and conceptual framework were chosen to 
reveal whether or not school building leaders took advantage of budget autonomy as a strategy. 
The research questions addressed principals’ decision-making, considered levels of school 
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performance, and time exposed to budget autonomy. Each research question required the 
analysis of budget data: mainly the district central office budget allocation and the principal’s 
actual budget for the school. School performance ranking as well as exposure (in years) to the 
concept of budget autonomy were also analyzed. Additionally, other data elements were included 
such as school level (elementary, middle, and high school), economic status, and enrollment 
level. 
 To assess whether principals have modified their budget from the district allocation, this 
study employed two separate tests: ANOVA single factor test of variance and a paired, two-
tailed t-test. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to analyze the differences among group 
means in a sample (Bowen, 2016). The ANOVA will measure whether the mean level of budget 
change varies by grade level.  A paired t-test, sometimes called dependent sample t-test, is a 
statistical procedure used to determine whether the mean difference between two sets of 
observations is zero (Bowen, 2016).  In a paired sample t-test, each subject or entity is measured 
twice, resulting in pairs of observations.  The first data set is the allocation from the district 
central office. Given the flexibility provided by the decentralization policy, those funds are to be 
budgeted as the school sees fit. In response, the second data set (the same money but as 
expenditure) will measure whether the principal exercised budget autonomy.   
While the ANOVA and t-test are uniquely well-suited to the research questions, several 
other tests were considered from the literature. An independent t-test sample might have some 
applicability, but the two data sets are related, so a paired approach is more appropriate (Bowen, 
2016).  This independent t-test is appropriate for RQ3 which examines unrelated schools by 
performance level.  A regression analysis might have been a good fit for predicting whether or 
not future decentralizations will yield budget autonomy, but these research questions are focused 
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on explaining current reform. A correlation study could have been useful in assessing the impact 
of budget autonomy on school performance, but that value judgment is outside the scope of these 
research questions. Finally, Steinberg (2014) pursued regression discontinuity to understand if 
achievement improved past the point of discontinuity when budget autonomy was introduced. 
Given that the stated research questions seek to identify changes in budgeting decisions, there is 
no discontinuity threshold that would be suitable for this analysis. 
 This study seeks to determine if principals made significant changes to their district 
budget allocation, so ANOVA and paired t-test are appropriate choices. A similar t-test was 
performed in the Greenlee (2007) study of budget autonomy in Florida. Greenlee’s approach 
allows for comparisons across a variety of schools while simultaneously using straight-forward 
analytics to identify whether the two data sets have statistically significant differences in their 
means.  
 One consideration in the application of both the t-tests and ANOVA is to ensure they are 
appropriate tests to analyze the given data set, which in this case is the school budget data from 
SVCS.  These tests do require an assumption of normality.  ANOVA is typically robust to 
deviations from normality when more than 30 participants are involved (Field, 2013). After 
reviewing the histograms of the data sets, the distributions have apparent normality, which 
permits the use of the t-test and ANOVA.  However, to reinforce this visual interpretation, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test was also applied to each data set in these analyses.  The Shapiro-Wilk test can 
be used to determine if a distribution differs significantly from a normal distribution, particularly 
in small samples (Field, 2013).   
 A Shapiro-Wilk statistic was generated for each of the four budget categories (Non-
Personnel, Support, Paraprofessionals, and Total Teacher) by school level (Elementary, Middle, 
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and High). The normality testing indicates a normal or near-normal distribution for most of the 
categories by level, with the exception of Paraprofessionals for all levels, and Total Teacher for 
the Elementary level.  To ensure those ANOVA and paired t-test findings are supported, a non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis or Wilcoxon signed-rank test was performed on each category by 
level that shows a significant departure from the normal distribution.  Those tests results are 
captured in Appendix C and D.  In all cases, the non-parametric test results agree and support the 
ANOVA and paired t-test results. 
 The paired t-test and ANOVA can be substantially influenced by the presence of outlier 
data points.  If only one school exercised autonomy but the comparisons of means tests were 
statistically significantly different, the interpretation of a finding of significance might be 
technically accurate, but practically misleading since the extent of exercise across the school 
district might actually be quite small.  When examining the number of data points at least one 
standard deviation from the mean, it became clear that one outlier was not triggering a technical 
finding of significant difference of the means.  In appendix B, the number of schools who 
reallocated their budget by more than one standard deviation from the mean are listed.  After 
reviewing the data, the mean does not appear to be impacted by any single extreme outliers since 
generally 20 percent of the observations are at least one standard deviation from the mean.  This 
question of data normality is addressed and answered in more detail in Appendices C and D.    
 Another aspect to consider in the application of these tests of comparisons of means is the 
application to the entire population of data, rather than to just a randomly selected sample.  Even 
though this data set is a census of one budget year, the 2016-17 data set is just a sample of a 
larger population of budget choices by SVCS school leaders over time.  Treating a data set as a 
sample from one moment in time can inform predictions about future cases (Gelman, 2009).  The 
35 
 
analysis of the 2016-17 census was used to make inferences about the extent of the exercise of 
budget autonomy by schools in SVCS, which is the goal of RQ1.   
 The dependent variable is the change in spending priorities as evidenced by the actual 
school budget after schools have had an opportunity to exercise flexibility. The dependent 
variable tests whether the budget allocation chosen varies from the original allocation. This study 
set out to analyze Spring Valley County Schools’ (SVCS) four main budget groupings: (a) 
personnel, (b) non-personnel, (c) special-programs personnel, and (d) special programs-non 
personnel. The grouping domains provided by the state and used by the district in their training 
manuals differed slightly from the groupings used in the budget actually submitted into the 
accounting system, but the underlying budget lines were the same. Given the groupings entered 
into the budget system were more detailed, this study employed the set of domains that the 
district actually entered into the budget system. A brief recap is here: 
Table 1 
Lists of Budget Categories at SVCS 2016-17 
Domains Used in SVCS Training Literature Domains Used in Budget Worksheets 
Personnel Total Teachers 
Non-personnel Paraprofessionals 
Special-programs personnel Support personnel 
Special programs-non personnel Non personnel 
 
This study analyzed SVCS’s four operational budget category groupings: (a) teachers, (b) 
paraprofessionals, (c) support personnel, and (d) non personnel.  The total school level 
expenditure for SVCS in 2016-17 was $641,756,851. Within each of the four domains, the 
dependent variable was the change in the principal expenditure, as measured by the percent of 
the budget spent on that category.  The independent variable, or explanatory variable, is the 
exercise of budget flexibility at the school level.  The four independent variables were measured 
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by determining whether the created budget is statistically different from the district’s original 
allocation by employing a dependent samples t-test.  
Since funds are distributed to schools in dollars based on enrollment, comparing total 
dollars across schools could skew any comparison because of the variability of enrollment 
counts. Similar to Greenlee (2007), this study elected to use percentages by budget line to allow 
for comparison across schools to permit comparison across schools. If only actual dollars were 
used, schools with larger enrollment could skew the analysis suggesting autonomy was more 
widespread than in actual practice. This calculation was completed by using the following 
formula where 𝐴1 is the district allocation for a budget domain and 𝐴2 is the principal selected 
budget for that domain: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =
(𝐴1 −𝐴2 )
𝐴1
  
Selection of district.  
To investigate the impact of decentralization on principal behavior, this study 
investigated one Georgia district that has formalized a Charter System contract. This school 
district will be known as Spring Valley County Schools for the purposes of this study. In 2012, 
Spring Valley County Schools (SVCS) entered into a contract with the State of Georgia to 
become a charter system. By joining the charter system, SVCS made an explicit commitment to 
budget autonomy and formally moved budgetary decision-making from the central office to the 
school site.   
 To assess the appropriateness of SVCS for this study, it is necessary to establish whether 
SVCS has built an environment that supports budget decentralization. To demonstrate a 
commitment to budget decentralization, Bennet et al. (2003) identified four useful criteria to 
identify the existence of distributed leadership in a school district setting. These key variables are 
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control/autonomy, organizational structure and agency, social and cultural context, and source of 
change (Bennett et al., 2003).  In the proceeding paragraphs, SVCS will be assessed according to 
these criteria. 
The first criteria is control/autonomy which is evidenced by formal policy that guides the 
actions of the organizations. SVCS has demonstrated a commitment to local control and school 
level autonomy in the management of school resources. The principles of transparency are 
documented in the School Allotment Guidelines, which specifies how resources are distributed 
to each school. SVCS publishes this guide annually to create a predictable distribution of funds. 
As stated in the opening section of the document: 
Each principal is fully empowered through a budgeting process that provides reasonable 
flexibility, high accountability, innovation, and results-driven budget recommendations 
aligned with each school’s strategic plan and the district’s overall mission. (p.3)  
 In addition, schools are also afforded flexibility to allocate non-personnel funds as they 
see fit. The Allotment Guide encourages each principal to use this flexibility to “allocate these 
non-personnel funds to various programs and accounts based on each school’s needs” (p. 4). 
The district should also be of sufficient size to necessitate the existence of a central office. 
Finally, the district should have a transparent budgeting process to objectively measure budget 
decisions. Each of these filters will be discussed.  
The second criteria is the existence of the organization structure to support budget 
decentralization. The district must have an explicit commitment to decentralization that defines 
the role of leaders at all levels of the district (Harris, 2013). SVCS’s organizational structure 
satisfies this criterion because they have completed the transition to a decentralized operating 
model under the Charter System Act. A Charter System is a school district that has a 
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performance contract with the State Board of Education granting freedom from most of state 
education code in exchange for a commitment to meet firm accountability targets (Georgia 
Department of Education, 2017). In its application, SVCS commits to providing schools with 
authority to build budgets that align specifically with “each school’s improvement plan” (p. 47).  
The third criteria is the social context of the increase in autonomy which is important 
because without internal cultural support, it is difficult for distributed leadership to be sustained. 
Scholars agree a key limitation of budget decentralization implementation is that schools are 
insufficiently trained to handle the complex challenges associated with local management (Honig 
& Rainey, 2012; Lauber & Warden, 1999; Mayer & LeChasseur, 2013; Steinberg, 2014). As a 
result of the school board’s decision to become a charter system, SVCS invested in a culture to 
ensure decentralization would be a priority for schools (Samuels, 2012). SVCS has prioritized 
the development of professional development of staff to prepare to succeed in this new 
environment.  
Finally, the fourth criteria, the source of change, influences the degree to which 
distributed leadership is a part of the organization. The impetus of the move to distributed 
leadership exerts significant influence on its viability in the organization (Bennett, 2003). In the 
case of SVCS, the school board drove the organization, after taking substantial comment from 
the community, to enter into a Charter System Contract to formalize decentralization. The source 
of the change in SVCS originated from the most senior levels of the organization which suggests 
its ramifications will be felt through the school district. 
In addition to the presence of distributed leadership, SVCS possesses the requisite size to 
analyze the exercise of budget autonomy. The complete sample of 94 SVCS traditional public 
schools provides adequate observations to provide the degrees of freedom to enable the use of 
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ANOVA and the paired sample t-test. This quantitative approach requires a detailed data set that 
is similar in size and scope to complete the ANOVA and the t-test calculations (Bowen, 2016). 
Additionally, SVCS has significant scale to warrant a central office with a team of professionals 
that calculates and manages budget allocations for the entire district.  
Finally, SVCS has a unique level of transparency to permit the analysis of budget 
autonomy. The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) established the Certificate of 
Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting Program (CAFR Program) to encourage and 
recognize local governments that go beyond the minimum requirements of generally accepted 
accounting principles to demonstrate transparency and full disclosure (Government Finance 
Officers Association, 2018). Only 13 school districts in Georgia have earned this highest level of 
achievement in 2016. Of those 13, only five had been operating as a charter system in 2016. Of 
those five systems that have demonstrated transparency and exemplary disclosure, only SVCS 
publishes a school allotment guide that documents allocation each school receives at the 
beginning of the budget cycle. This document details the district’s budget allocation guide which 
provides a further degree of transparency that separates SVCS from the other charter systems in 
the state of Georgia.  
This commitment to policy and practice makes SVCS an appropriate choice for this 
secondary data analysis and presents a unique opportunity to observe principal decision-making 
in a distributed leadership environment.  SVCS was the district investigated to answer these 
research questions because of its explicit commitment to budget autonomy and its execution of a 
charter system contract with the Georgia Department of Education.  
Data selection. 
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This study analyzed SVCS’s four operational budget category groupings: (a) teachers, (b) 
paraprofessionals, (c) support personnel, and (d) non personnel.  As discussed earlier, these 
categories are used by the finance division of SVCS and provide a representative approach to 
categorizing the total spending by SVCS schools. The underlying budget categories are 
consistent with the State of Georgia’s Department of Education finance structure.  
 Performance levels bands were defined by the CCRPI single score for 2016-17. To create 
a categorical variable and to lessen the burden on the precision of CCRPI, schools that scored 
below the district median were low-performing and schools that scored above were high-
performing. Since the State accountability calculations are different for each grade level of 
school, schools were sorted by the median score for the school level. Elementary schools median 
single CCRPI score was 78.2, the middle school median score was 71.1, and the high school 
median score was 80.5 (GOSA, 2017). 
 This study abided by the District budget categorization because this taxonomy is applied 
consistently across all schools in district data. This approach comprehensively covers all state-
allocated funding streams and is mutually exclusive so there is no overlap between the categories 
which might impact data accuracy. 
 Data Collection. 
 As publicly funded institutions, school districts are subject to the Georgia Open Records 
Act which affirms “public access to public records should be encouraged to foster confidence in 
government and so that the public can evaluate the expenditure of public funds” (Open Records 
Act, 2012, p.1). This information includes key documents such as school-level budgets. The 
request that was sent to the dedicated district Open Records office was on the materials 
principals received in the preparation of their school-level budget for the 2016-17 school year. 
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Including specifically: 
• The budget development template for each school which includes the allocation by 
budget line. 
• The enrollment projections that led to those allocations for each school. I suspect this 
is already included in the budget development template. 
• The actual budget approved by the School Governance Council and submitted into 
the district budget system. 
 Open Record laws require a three business day turnaround with an estimate of how long 
it will take to return the data (Open Records, 2012). Within that timeframe the district produced 
five files to answer the request. The district generated by line budget data from the 2016-17 
school year for elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and charter schools. 
Additionally, the district produced an enrollment report for 2016-17. The three budget files 
which became the basis of this analysis totaled 550 pages. When converted from their pdf file 
format into Excel, there were approximately 15,000 lines of data. 
 Additionally, SVCS publishes the district’s School Allotment Guidelines annually and 
distributes them to the appropriate stakeholders. The school allotment guides lay out the 
distribution of resources according to formulas that are driven by actual school-level enrollment. 
The Allotment guide is at the heart of the budgeting process because it lays out how resources 
are distributed to schools. Only enrollment drives these allocations, as the guide is clear that “all 
formulas used in allotments are applied the same way to all schools regardless of a school’s Title 
I status, Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015” (p.3).  This document is approved at a public 
school board meeting and published on the district website. 
Sample size. 
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To provide the maximum degrees of freedom and improve the quality of the findings, all 
94 SVCS school budgets were included in this study from the 2016-17 school year. Even though 
this data set is a census of one budget year, the 2016-17 data set is just a sample of a larger 
population of budget choices by SVCS school leaders over time.  Treating a data set as a sample 
from one moment in time can inform predictions about future cases (Gelman, 2009).   
These schools receive the same central office communication and operate under standard 
district policies. While informal communications may differ, the policy of the district is 
ultimately governed by its formal documents that are approved by the Board of Education. Both 
the Allotment Guidelines and the School Autonomy Guidebook are developed by district 
leadership and approved by the School Board during open session of a public board meeting. The 
SVCS budget office communicates consistent information to all schools with no regard for 
performance. All budget data was gathered through an open records requests to give district 
budget officials an opportunity to verify the accuracy of those records before they are released 
for analysis (Open Records Act, 2012).   
 There were several important exclusions from this data set. The first, and perhaps more 
substantial, exclusion were district-authorized charter schools. There were nine district-
authorized charters in SVCS in 2016-17 served about 4,000 kids or about 4% of the total SVCS 
student population. Charter schools were excluded because this study seeks to measure the 
exercise of the introduction of budget flexibility which is at the core of the construction of a 
charter school in Georgia. The Georgia Department of Education is clear that autonomy and 
flexibility are the main distinguishing elements between charter schools and traditional public 
schools (Georgia Department of Education, 2019).  Charter schools have no initial guidance 
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from a district budget allocation so the study would not be able to identify the exercise of 
autonomy from the district’s decentralization initiative.   
Additionally, independent charter schools are not beholden to any central office budget 
accountability. There are no district-mandated staffing ratios, curricular decisions, or 
instructional investments that could guide or constrain their decision-making, so the presence of 
the district’s decentralization initiative of 2012 would not create an inflection point for charter 
leader behavior. Since there is no baseline of centralization for purposes of comparison, 
independent charter schools were excluded from this study to focus on the impact of the 
decentralization reform on principal behavior. 
 SVCS launched a virtual school in 2016-17 and that was also excluded from this analysis. 
The virtual school was in a planning year and had no students or teachers assigned to it in this 
planning year. All $1.8 million allocated was not recorded as spent during the 2016-17 budget 
cycle so it did not provide a useful basis for analysis. A college and career academy was also 
launched in 2016-17. This was a planning year and no students were reported to be enrolled so it 
was excluded from this analysis. 
 Another exception was A Elementary School because the school’s budget was not 
balanced, in other words, the district invested additional dollars for some special programs which 
the school did not implement. Of the 95 schools in SVCS, A Elementary was the only school that 
was excluded from the analysis. If it was included, the lack of spending of the extra allocation 
from the district could be construed as an affirmative action from the principal, but given the 
school was not permitted to reallocate those funds for other purposes, it would be misleading to 
assume this absence of spending was an example of budget autonomy. Since the principal was 
not permitted to reallocate these funds, there is no evidence the principal chose one investment 
44 
 
over another. The impact of this exclusion will be small since A Elementary is one of the 
smallest elementary schools in the district with an enrollment of 593 which represents about 
0.6% of district enrollment.  
Data analysis. 
The analysis to identify the exercise of budget flexibility was done by comparing the 
district allocation to the budget actually created by the school. The SVCS School Allotment 
Guidelines identify hundreds of separate budget lines that schools can transfer funds between at 
their discretion. To allow for ease of comparison, this study employed the consolidation 
approach used by SVCS finance staff to group the hundreds of different line items into four 
comprehensive budget categories: total teachers, paraprofessionals, support staff, and non-
personnel.  
 Each of the four categories has a consistent interpretation that are all coded by the district 
budget office. These categories are comprehensive of the school budget and mutually exclusive 
so each allocation only appears in one category. The category of “teachers” includes any teacher 
of record who is directly responsible for educating children, which includes traditional core 
subjects, electives, special education, and career and technical educators. Examples of these 
types of teachers in core tested subjects in elementary and middle school are: mathematics, 
science, English language arts, and social studies. The category of paraprofessional includes the 
allocations for non-certified staff that are assigned to specific classrooms. The category of 
“support” includes all other adults in the school house that are not teachers of record. 
Specifically, this category includes the principal, assistant principal, office assistants, counselors, 
nurse, security offices, custodians, and other support personnel. The “non personnel” category 
includes all portions of the budget that are not personnel-related including office supplies, library 
orders, materials, copier fees and maintenance, in-system travel, and postage.  
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 Although the Open Records request specified the data to be returned in Excel format, 
their budget system was only able to generate portable document format (pdf) which allows for 
easier file transfer, but is difficult to analyze. 
Software call PDF Converter permitted the conversion to Excel. One of the unfortunate 
byproducts of pdf conversion is much of the original formatting was lost from the original 
district presentation. Specifically, columns were misaligned and all internal calculations are 
replaced with static numbers. Before proceeding with the data analysis, these data sets were 
reconstituted and reformatted to permit computation and analysis. As part of this process, 
subtotals were manually verified to ensure no error was introduced. Also, the total for each 
school was checked and finally, the overall total of $641,756 of school-level budget spend was 
reviewed and verified. After that data was in a usable format, summary tables organized by key 
budget categories were created that included key descriptive fields. Those specific areas are 
grade level, enrollment, and CCRPI single score from the state accountability system. Each of 
those will be described in detail.  Although the formatting was done in Excel, the more 
sophisticated calculations were completed in IBM SPSS Statistics version 26. 
The goal of the first research question is to assess the extent to which schools exercise the 
budget flexibility provided to them by the school district. To answer the first research question, 
this study of SVCS first investigated the number of schools that exercised budget flexibility in 
the fiscal year 2017, three years after all schools were required to adopt charter system practices 
(Walker, 2016). The district adopted a three-year phased-in approach in three cohorts, so 2016 
was the first year of complete data. For this study, only 2016-17 data was used because the 
district’s senior administration changed in June 2016 and the focus on decentralization was de-
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emphasized during the transition. A new five-year strategic plan was launched in the summer of 
2017 and references to budget autonomy or flexibility had been removed.  
The first descriptive indicator is grade level. At SVCS, there are three grade levels: 
elementary, middle and high school. SVCS Elementary schools span from preschool to fifth 
grade. Middle schools serve students sixth to eighth grade. High schools serve students in ninth 
through twelfth-grade graduation. This indicator is important because of differences in budget 
allocation and resource base of grade levels. 
The next descriptive indicator that is included in this data set is enrollment. Since 
enrollment is the key driver of absolute dollars allocated to a school, it will be necessary to track 
the size of each school to permit relative analyses. This data was provided for the study as part of 
the district response to the Open Records request. The final descriptive data element is CCRPI 
which was described in detail in the research design section of this study. The data is provided 
for each school and is available on the Georgia Department of Education’s website. 
The next analytical step was to understand if spending allocations varied by school level. 
The district allocation guide is divided into grade-level band of elementary, middle and high. 
These three grade-level bands made up the groupings of the first analysis. If all 94 schools were 
combined into one analysis and there are core differences among the allocations, the differences 
in allocations could distort the findings because principals have different sized budgets based on 
school enrollment.  Larger schools with bigger budgets, such as high schools, could mask effects 
at schools with lower student counts so it was necessary to look at percent budget change for 
each budget domain. ANOVA is a useful test to compare the means of multiple sets data.  In this 
case, the data sets analyzed were the allocation percentage changes for each budget domain.   
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 ANOVA was performed for all four categories to ascertain whether percentage 
differences vary by grade level. If there is a finding of statistical significance between the groups 
as a whole, the Tukey post hoc test was applied to identify where the difference lies between the 
groups.  Once it was determined that there are differences amongst grade levels, then it was 
necessary to isolate those differences. The two-tailed t-test demonstrates whether two data sets 
are statistically different (Pallant, 2013). The first data set is the formula-driven resource 
allocation from the district for each school.  The second data set is the actual budget approved by 
each school for each of the four budget categories. The descriptive attributes of this data set are 
detailed in Appendix A. 
In summary, the variables are identified in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Variable Identifiers 
District Budget Category District Allocation Principal-Created Budget 
Teacher  𝐴1 𝐴2 
Paraprofessionals 𝐵1 𝐵2 
Support 𝐶1 𝐶2 
Non personnel 𝐷1 𝐷2 
 
 For the ANOVA analyses which measure budget changes across categories, the 
dependent variable is the percentage change in budget allocation.  For the paired t-tests which are 
applied within budget categories, the dependent variable is the change in budget allocation.   In 
both cases, there is a separate independent variable and dependent variable for each category to 
assess whether budget flexibility has been exercised for that specific budget grouping. In total, 
there were four dependent and four independent variables aligning to each of the SVCS budget 
groupings for each analysis. If the hypothesis that the means are different is rejected, then the 
average school in the district would not have exercised flexibility for that budget category.   In 
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addition, each school was analyzed to see how many changed their budget by one standard 
deviation from the mean which is captured in Appendix B. 
To complete these calculations, the first analysis was to identify the means of each data 
set. The mean is the arithmetic average of all values in a data distribution which is the average of 
all of the numbers in the data set (Bowen, 2006). 
?̅? =  
∑ 𝑋
𝑁
 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) =  
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
 
 The variable 𝑋  was the mean of the allocation for each budget category. The variable 𝑁 
represents the number of schools in this analysis. 
ANOVA tests the equality of these group means by partitioning variances to different 
sources. 
Mean Squares Formula 
 𝑀𝑆𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛=  
𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 
𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛   
   
𝑀𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   =  
𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 
𝑑𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   
 
F Formula 
𝐹   =  
𝑀𝑆𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 
𝑀𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛   
 
 
The F statistic is the value from the ANOVA test used to find out if the means between 
two populations are significantly different.  The F statistic is used to decide to support or reject 
the null hypothesis. If the calculated F value in a test is larger than the F statistic, the null 
49 
 
hypothesis is rejected. The p-value is determined by the F statistic and is the probability that the 
results could have happened by chance (Bowen, 2016).  
The paired samples t-test compares two observations of a variable in order to determine 
whether there is statistical evidence that the associated population means are significantly 
different. The formula for the paired t-test is: 
 
The variable S is the sample standard deviation defined by: 
 
 The hypotheses of these analyses are designed to test whether the mean budget allocation 
from the district is changed overall when examining the school approved budget. This indicates 
mean total changes in a budget flexibility environment. The null hypothesis of the ANOVA test 
for the first research question is that the means of the three sets are the same so, on average, there 
is no exercise of budget autonomy for SVCS. The alternative hypothesis is that the means are not 
the same therefore budget autonomy has been exercised by some of the schools in the category. 
This analysis design does not place a value on the exercise of budget autonomy. This lack of 
exercise of autonomy may have occurred because the district allocation met the needs of the 
average school. The motivation for the lack of exercise of autonomy is beyond the scope of these 
research questions which are designed to understand if budget autonomy is exercised at SVCS 
after the decentralization initiative was fully implemented.   
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The second research question of this dissertation tests whether the exercise of budget 
autonomy varies by a dichotomized representation of school performance. For RQ2, the data set 
is divided into two groups by the characteristic of performance.  To answer this question, a 
paired t-test is most appropriate.  This is the same test as in RQ1, though in this case the analysis 
is applied to grouping of schools sorted by performance rather than just by school level. To 
reflect the differences in calculations of CCRPI by grade level, separate medians are calculated 
for each grade level at SVCS to create two bands of schools: high-performing and low-
performing. 
The null hypothesis for low-performing schools is that the means of both sets of budget 
expenditure data are the same. Hence, low-performing schools would not indicate evidence 
regarding mean changes in District allocations to mean school budgets. A finding of lack of 
implementation for low-performing schools would suggest that even in a distributed leadership 
environment, decentralization may not be an appropriate reform strategy for low-performing 
schools as it is currently constructed in SVCS. If the means are statistically different, low-
performing schools in SVCS have shown evidence of a mean change in district allocation to 
school approved budget.  Schools across performance bands are not compared to each other, 
rather the means changes for low-performing and high-performing schools are calculated 
independently to assess the change for each grouping. 
For high-performing schools, the null hypothesis is that means are the same which would 
indicate that the average high-performing school in SVCS has not exercised budget autonomy. 
The alternative hypothesis is that means of both sets of budget expenditure data are statistically 
different. Therefore, the average high-performing school has exercised budget autonomy and 
thus the null hypothesis is rejected.  
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RQ3 investigates whether the incidence of autonomy varies by the amount of time that 
schools have operated in the charter system and were permitted to exercise budget autonomy. As 
part of the Charter System contract with the State of Georgia, the district committed to a phased 
implementation of the budget flexibility afforded to school principals. This phase-in occurred 
over three years with the last cohort with the opportunity to exercise flexibility in 2016-17. Since 
the sample size is unequal when comparing the three implementation cohorts, it is necessary to 
ensure that there is homogeneity of variance to be able to apply ANOVA (Bowen, 2016). 
Levene’s test demonstrates that the variances are equal since p value > α, which in this case is 
0.05.  
Since SVCS is a growing system, schools were opened during the years of this phased 
implementation. Two schools fell into this category – elementary school B and elementary 
school C. The district leadership assigned these schools to Cohort 3 which was reflected in this 
analysis. 
Results. 
The purpose of the present study was to assess whether principals exercise budget 
authority in a district that has a distributed leadership environment.  Using actual budget data 
from a large urban/suburban school district from the 2016-17 school year as its outcome 
variable, the study employed a quantitative analysis to capture principal budget decisions.  
This study employed a similar approach as Greenlee (2007) to employ quantitative analysis to 
assess whether principal budgetary decisions significantly differed from the standard allocations 
provided by the district central office. Specifically, the results of ANOVA and then t-tests were 
used to demonstrate whether mean school-level budget decisions differed from the mean district 
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allocations. Each of the 94 schools in SVCS was included in the calculation to derive the mean 
spending amounts for each of the specific research questions.  
To answer RQ1, the means of the four budget groups were investigated to assess whether 
the district allocations were statistically different from the average budget decisions at the 
schools. To address RQ2, this analysis was also performed for means of low-performing and 
high-performing schools to determine if the average school-level decision differs from the 
district allocation. To address RQ3, the amount of time school operate with budget autonomy is 
analyzed at the school level. Since there were three cohorts of data, ANOVA was the best test to 
see if means vary for at least one of the four budget categories. All 94 traditional schools were 
included in this analysis. They were coded by year that they had the ability to implement their 
budget autonomy. Table 3 from the school district demonstrates the pace and cadence of the 
autonomies granted to schools by cohort. 
Table 3 
Budget Decentralization Implementation Schedule 
 
(Charter System Planning Document, 2013) 
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 Hypothesis. 
The null hypothesis was that there is no relationship between the independent variable 
and change in budget allocation.  Therefore, the average Spring Valley County School (SVCS) 
did not opt to build a different budget than the district allocation. A school-level analysis was 
also considered to assess the number of schools that are impacting the overall average.  As a 
reminder, a rejection of this hypothesis means SVCS is experiencing the exercise of autonomy 
which runs counter to the research.  Though the evidence from this analysis would not 
demonstrate a causal relationship, if budget autonomy is exercised, the role of the district’s 
investment in distributed leadership would warrant further investigation.  
 The first analysis grouped each schools spending into four distinct budget categories and 
then calculated the average amount of spending per budget category. Table 4 displays a 
descriptive summary of all 94 schools at SVCS: 
 
Table 4 
 
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for all schools (n=94) 
 
Budget Category Average of Earned 
Percent of School Budget 
Average of Allocated 
Percent of School 
Budget 
Average Increase 
(Decrease) 
Teachers Total 69.43% 69.35% (0.08%) 
Support 18.95% 19.72% 0.77% 
Paraprofessionals 5.00% 5.17% 0.18% 
Non Personnel 6.63% 5.76% (0.87%) 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 
 Taken from the districtwide perspective, there were changes in every budget category. 
The general reduction in non personnel expenditure was the greatest percentage change. One risk 
of calculating only districtwide changes is the possibility that there were changes in both 
additions and subtractions that may be canceling each other out which may mitigate some of the 
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findings. Given the differences in the allocation between elementary, middle and high schools, 
the next analysis was to review the same average allocations by school level. 
Table 5 
 
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for Elementary Schools (n=58) 
 
Budget Category Average of Earned % 
of School Budget 
Average of Used % 
of School Budget 
Average Increase 
(Decrease) 
Teachers Total 69.18% 69.53% 0.35% 
Support 17.87% 18.34% 0.46% 
Paraprofessionals 6.66% 6.91% 0.24% 
Non Personnel 6.28% 5.22% (1.06%) 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 
 At the elementary school level, the general reduction in non-personnel reallocation 
matches the districtwide trend. However, unlike the other grade levels, the average elementary 
school slightly increased its spending on teacher total spending.  
 
Table 6 
 
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for Middle Schools (n=19) 
 
Budget Category Average of 
Earned % of 
School Budget 
Average of Used % 
of School Budget 
Average Increase 
(Decrease) 
Teachers Total 74.94% 73.83% (1.11%) 
Support 17.48% 18.83% 1.34% 
Paraprofessionals 1.95% 2.12% 0.17% 
Non Personnel 5.63% 5.22% (0.41%) 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
Middle school principals, on average, shifted spending to fund the support personnel 
budget category. This increase was funded by a reallocation from non personnel spending and 
spending on teachers. High school principals, on average, had the most pronounced spending 
shift. Each budget category was reduced to drive spending increases in the support personnel 
category. Besides relatively modest adjustments to average paraprofessional allocations, middle 
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school and high school spending patterns are directionally aligned, resources were reallocated 
away from non personnel toward support spending. 
Table 7 
 
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for High Schools (n=17) 
 
Budget Category Average of 
Earned % of 
School Budget 
Average of Used % 
of School Budget 
Average Increase 
(Decrease) 
Teachers Total 64.13% 63.71% (0.42%) 
Support 24.24% 25.43% 1.19% 
Paraprofessionals 2.71% 2.66% (0.05%) 
Non Personnel 8.93% 8.19% (0.73%) 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
 While total spending on teachers and paraprofessionals was mixed across the three levels 
of schools, at each level the average spending by principals on support personnel increased and 
the average spending on non personnel decreased. The average spending by principals on support 
personnel increased at each level but was most pronounced at the secondary level where it 
increased by about 1.25%. Given the average secondary school budget is over $9.3 million, this 
change represents about $100,000 per school. 
Research question one.  
RQ1 examines to what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility when it is provided in 
a distributed leadership environment. The first level of analysis is a descriptive calculation of the 
absolute value of percent budget change by budget category. Across all grade levels, more than 
8.0 percent of school budgets changed on average according to Table 8 below. These changes 
were concentrated largely in non personnel. As Tables 5, 6 and 7 clarify, these changes were 
consistently reductions in non-personnel expenditure.  From Table 8 it is shown the change in 
non personnel averaged about 20 percent across all schools. By far the least amount of change 
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occurred in the total amount spent on teachers, which averaged less than 1.5% change in budget 
allocations when principals were free to allocate their funds.  The weighted average is based on 
the actual school level allocations described in Table 4. 
Table 8 
Mean of Absolute Value of Average Percent Change by Budget Category (n=94) 
 
Budget Categories Elementary 
Schools 
Middle 
Schools 
High 
Schools 
Average 
Across Levels 
Teachers Total 0.81% 2.28% 2.70% 1.45% 
Support 5.68% 9.21% 5.96% 6.44% 
Paraprofessionals 4.13% 11.58% 7.13% 6.18% 
Non Personnel 21.67% 20.28% 17.79% 20.69% 
Weighted Average 3.14% 5.16% 4.44% 3.79% 
 
 To deepen the understanding of the extent that principals exercised mean budget 
flexibility, it is helpful to examine whether principals at different grade levels exercise mean 
flexibility differently from each other. To conduct this analysis, the study employed ANOVA’s 
for each of the four budget categories. One-way ANOVA is used to test the null hypothesis that 
the means of several populations, composed of different grade levels, are all equal. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis would indicate that spending allocations, on average, differ by grade level. To 
allow for comparisons across schools of vastly different sizes, those amounts were converted to 
percentages and the absolute value of those changes were calculated.  If variances were 
determined to be unequal from Levene’s test, then Welch’s test would be appropriate for 
comparing means when there is not homogeneity of variance in the data. 
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Table 9 
Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94) 
Groups N Mean SD SE 
Elementary Schools 58 0.81% 1.15% 0.15% 
Middle Schools 19 2.28% 0.43% 0.43% 
High Schools 17 2.70% 0.38% 0.38% 
Total 94 1.45% 1.61% 0.17% 
 
Table 10 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by 
School Level 
 
Levene’s Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
4.877 2  91 0.01 
 
 The p-value of the Levene’s test is 0.01 which is less than 0.05 so the variances are 
unequal.  Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use 
Welch's ANOVA to compares three means to see if there is a statistically significant difference 
among the means when the data violates the assumption of homogeneity of variances.  In SPSS, 
the Welch tests output is: 
Table 11 
Welch ANOVA for Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level 
Welch Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
14.07 2  28.326 0.00 
 
 The Welch output is significant at the 0.05 level so since p < 0.05, there are statistically 
significant differences among one or more of the school level groupings.  Since the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (14.07) was used, 
which was significant at the .05 alpha level (p shown as .000, that is p < .05), so it can be 
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concluded that at least one of the three school levels differ significantly on their average percent 
change.  Post hoc follow-up procedures (e.g., Games-Howell) were conducted to test the 
difference between all unique pairwise comparisons.  The Games-Howell test is required to 
identify the source of the variance.  Since the Games-Howell test does not rely on equal 
variances and sample sizes, it is often recommended over other post hoc approaches such as 
Tukey's test (Field, 2013). 
Table 12 
Games-Howell Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94) 
     
Elementary School High School -1.89%* 0.40% .000 
Middle School -1.47%* 0.45% .011 
High School Elementary School -1.89%* 0.40% .000 
Middle School 0.42% 0.57% .745 
Middle School Elementary School 1.47%* 0.45% .011 
High School -0.42% 0.57% .745 
*p < .05 
 
 There was a statistically significant difference between groups as determined by Welch’s 
test (F = 14.15, p = 0.00).  The Welch test indicates which of the budget changes from Table 9 
were statistically significant. A Games-Howell post hoc test revealed that the average change in 
elementary principals’ budget allocation (0.81%) was statistically significantly lower than 
middle school principals (2.28%) and high school principals (2.70%).  There was no statistically 
significant difference between middle and high school principals (p = 0.745). 
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Table 13 
Paraprofessionals Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94) 
Groups N Mean SD SE 
Elementary Schools 58 4.13% 6.05% 0.79% 
Middle Schools 19 11.58% 24.66% 5.66% 
High Schools 17 7.13% 12.40% 3.01% 
Total 94 6.18% 13.23% 1.37% 
 
Table 14 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Paraprofessional Total: Budget Percent 
Difference by School Level 
 
Levene’s Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
10.58 2  91 0.00 
 
 The p-value of the Levene’s test is < 0.05 so it is assumed the variances are unequal.  
Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use Welch's 
ANOVA to compares three means to see if they are equal when the data violates the assumption 
of homogeneity of variances.  In SPSS, the Welch’s output is: 
Table 15 
Welch ANOVA for Paraprofessional: Budget Percent Difference by School Level 
Welch Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
1.24 2  24.59 0.31 
 
 The Welch output is not significant at the 0.05 level.  Since p = 0.31, there are not 
significant differences between the three school level groupings.  Since the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (1.24) was used, 
which was not significant at the .05 alpha level (p =0.31), so it can be concluded that average 
percent change of paraprofessional spending does not differ significantly by school level.  Since 
there was no statistically significant difference observed, no post hoc analysis was done.  Though 
60 
 
there were spending differences on paraprofessionals, these differences were not statistically 
significant among the groups.  
Table 16 
Support Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94) 
 
Groups N Mean SD SE 
Elementary Schools 58 5.68% 3.95% 0.51% 
Middle Schools 19 9.21% 6.40% 1.47% 
High Schools 17 5.96% 3.04% 0.74% 
Total 94 6.44% 4.59% 0.47% 
 
Table 17 
 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Support Total: Budget Percent Difference by 
School Level 
 
Levene’s Statistic Df1 Df2 Sig. 
6.17 2 91 0.03 
 
 The p-value of the Levene’s test is 0.03 which is less than 0.05 so the variances are 
unequal.  Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use 
Welch's ANOVA to compares three means to see if they are equal when the data violates the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances.  In SPSS, the Welch’s output is: 
 
Table 18 
Welch ANOVA for Support Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level 
Welch Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
2.53 2  33.34 0.10 
 
 The Welch output is not significant at the 0.05 level.  Since p = 0.10, there are not 
significant differences between the three school level groupings.  Since the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (2.53) was used, 
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which was not significant at the .05 alpha level (p shown as .10, that is p > .05), so it can be 
concluded that the average percent change of support personnel spending does not differ 
statically significantly levels by school level.  Since there was no statistically significant 
difference observed among the groups, no post hoc analysis was done.   
Table 19 
Non Personnel Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94) 
 
Groups N  Mean SD  SE 
Elementary Schools 58  21.67% 14.18%  1.86% 
Middle Schools 19  20.28% 11.57%  2.65% 
High Schools 17  17.79%  12.58%  3.05% 
Total 94  20.69% 13.36%  1.38% 
 
 
Table 20 
 
ANOVA - Non Personnel Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94) 
 
Source of Variation SS Df MS F p F crit 
Between Groups 201.45 2 100.72 .56 .57 3.10 
Within Groups 16408.46 91 180.31 
   
Total 16609.91 93         
p <  0.05 
 Non personnel spending reallocations are not statistically significant since the F(.56) 
value is below the critical value. Levene’s test was not significant so the variances are assumed 
to be equal.  No post hoc analysis was completed because there was no statistically significant 
difference observed.  When given budget autonomy, principals, on average, do not choose to 
make different investments in non personnel spending by grade level. 
 In each case except for teacher spending, the budget category percent change did change 
but not at statistically significant levels.  The final analysis to satisfy RQ1 is to test whether the 
differences in spending are significant within each budget category. The paired sample t-test 
identified whether the changes within the average school within budget categories were 
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significant and unlikely due to chance.  To ensure this data met the normalcy requirement for this 
test, a Shapiro-Wilk test was run and the results are described in Appendix C and below. When 
the Shapiro-Wilk test showed a distribution to be non-normal, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
was also performed which agreed with the t-test findings.  These Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
findings are documented in Appendix D.  The analysis that follows is the results of the paired t-
test for each budget category by school level to compare the district allocation percentage and 
the actually allocated percentage by the principal. 
Total teacher spending. 
Table 21 
Teacher Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School 
  Earned Percent of School 
Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 69.18% 69.53% 
Standard Deviation 2.44% 2.61% 
Observations 58 58 
Df 57 
 
t Stat (2.95) 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.00 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.00 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 There was a statistically significant difference in the mean of the earned budget for 
teachers (M=69.18%, SD=2.44%) and the allocated budget for teachers (M=69.53%, 
SD=2.61%).  Mean difference in teacher spending did significantly change when elementary 
principals were presented with budget autonomy.  The number of schools that experienced a 
change of more than one standard deviation is 12 from Appendix B so no single outlier appears 
to have skewed the mean.   
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Table 22 
Teacher Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 74.94% 73.83% 
Standard Deviation 1.89% 2.79% 
Observations 19 19 
Df 18 
 
t Stat 2.52 
 
P(T < = t) two-tail 0.02 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.10 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
There was a statistically significant difference in the mean of the earned budget for 
teachers (M=74.94%, SD=1.89%) and the allocated budget for teachers (M=73.83%, 
SD=2.79%).  Mean difference in teacher spending did significantly change when middle school 
principals were presented with budget autonomy.  The number of schools that experienced a 
change of more than one standard deviation is 5 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to 
have skewed the mean. 
Table 23 
Teacher Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of School 
Budget 
Mean 64.13% 63.71% 
Standard Deviation 5.48% 5.65% 
Observations 17 17 
Df 16 
 
t Stat 0.87 
 
P(T < = t) two-tail 0.40 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.12 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
In high schools, there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean of the 
earned budget for teachers (M=64.13%, SD=5.48%) and the allocated budget for teachers 
64 
 
(M=63.71%, SD=5.65%).  Mean difference in teacher spending did not significantly change 
when high school principals were presented with budget autonomy.  The number of schools that 
experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 2 from Appendix B so no single 
outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
 The change at the middle school level was the greatest.  The average middle school 
principal significantly decreased their spending on teachers by about 1.1%, which is 
approximately 1.5 full-time teacher salaries.   
Paraprofessional expenditure.  
Table 24 
 
Paraprofessional Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 6.66% 6.91% 
Standard Deviation 1.26% 1.33% 
Observations 58 58 
Df 57 
 
t Stat (4.46) 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.00 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 For elementary school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the 
mean of the earned budget for paraprofessionals (M=6.66%, SD=1.26%) and the allocated 
budget for paraprofessionals (M=6.91%, SD=1.33%).  Mean difference in paraprofessional 
spending did significantly change when elementary principals were presented with budget 
autonomy.  The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard 
deviation is 11 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
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Table 25 
Paraprofessional Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School 
 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 1.95% 2.12% 
Standard Deviation 0.83% 0.84% 
Observations 19 19 
Df 18 
 
t Stat (2.13) 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.04 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.10 
 
Alpha = 0.05  
 For middle school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the mean 
of the earned budget for paraprofessionals (M=1.95%, SD=0.83%) and the allocated budget for 
paraprofessionals (M=2.12%, SD=0.84%).  Mean difference in paraprofessional spending did 
significantly change when elementary principals were presented with budget autonomy.   The 
number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 2 from 
Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. For high school principals, 
there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean of the earned budget for 
paraprofessionals (M=2.71%, SD=1.59%) and the allocated budget for paraprofessionals 
(M=2.66%, SD=1.56%).  Mean difference in paraprofessional spending did not significantly 
change when elementary principals were presented with budget autonomy.   
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Table 26 
Paraprofessional Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 2.71% 2.66% 
Standard Deviation 1.59% 1.56% 
Observations 17 17 
Df 16 
 
t Stat 0.55 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.59 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.11 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 
3 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
Mean spending levels for paraprofessionals did increase at the elementary and middle 
school level. Paraprofessional mean spending for high schools did not change significantly.  The 
largest mean change was at the elementary level of 0.25 percent of the overall school budget.  
 Support personnel expenditure. 
Table 27 
 
Support Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School 
 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 17.87% 18.34% 
Standard Deviation 2.18% 2.69% 
Observations 58 58 
Df 57 
 
t Stat (3.07) 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.00 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.00 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
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 For elementary school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the 
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=17.87%, SD=2.18%) and the allocated 
budget for support personnel (M=18.34%, SD=2.69%).  Mean difference in support personnel 
spending did significantly change when elementary school principals were presented with budget 
autonomy.  The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard 
deviation is 4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
Table 28 
 
Support Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School 
 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 17.48% 18.83% 
Standard Deviation 1.44% 2.34% 
Observations 19 19 
Df 18 
 
t Stat (3.84) 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.00 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.10 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 For middle school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the mean 
of the earned budget for support personnel (M=17.48%, SD=1.44%) and the allocated budget for 
support personnel (M=18.83%, SD=2.34%).  Both data sets were normally distributed.  Mean 
difference in support personnel spending did significantly change when middle school principals 
were presented with budget autonomy.  The number of schools that experienced a change of 
more than one standard deviation is 4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have 
skewed the mean. For high school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the 
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=24.24%, SD=4.90%) and the allocated 
budget for support personnel (M=25.43%, SD=5.65%).  Mean difference in support personnel 
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spending did significantly change when high school principals were presented with budget 
autonomy.   
Table 29 
Support Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School 
 
  Earned Percent of School 
Budget 
Allocated Percent of School 
Budget 
Mean 24.24% 25.43% 
Standard Deviation 4.90% 5.65% 
Observations 17 17 
Df 16 
 
t Stat (3.97) 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.12 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 
4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
At each grade level, mean spending on support personnel increased. This mean increase 
was especially pronounced at the secondary level where both middle and high school principals 
increased mean spending on support by more than 1 percent.  
Non personnel expenditure. 
 For elementary school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the 
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=6.28%, SD=0.79%) and the allocated 
budget for support personnel (M=5.22%, SD=1.24%).  Mean difference in non personnel 
spending did significantly change when elementary school principals were presented with budget 
autonomy.   The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard 
deviation is 9 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
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Table 30 
 
Non Personnel Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School 
 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 6.28% 5.22% 
Standard Deviation 0.79% 1.24% 
Observations 58 58 
Df 57 
 
t Stat 6.49 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.00 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.00 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
Table 31 
Non Personnel Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of 
School Budget 
Mean 5.63% 5.22% 
Standard Deviation 0.44% 1.30% 
Observations 19 19 
Df 18 
 
t Stat 1.35 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.66 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.10 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 For middle school principals, there was not a statistically significant difference in the 
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=5.63%, SD=0.44%) and the allocated 
budget for support personnel (M=5.22%, SD=1.30%).  Mean difference in non personnel 
spending did not significantly change when middle school principals were presented with budget 
autonomy.  The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard 
deviation is 4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
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Table 32 
Non Personnel Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School 
 
  Earned Percent of 
School Budget 
Allocated Percent of School 
Budget 
Mean 8.93% 8.19% 
Standard Deviation 2.05% 1.50% 
Observations 17 17 
Df 16 
 
t Stat 1.50 
 
P(T< = t) two-tail 0.11 
 
t Critical two-tail 2.12 
 
Alpha = 0.05 
 For high school principals, there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean 
of the earned budget for support personnel (M=8.93%, SD=2.05%) and the allocated budget for 
support personnel (M=8.19%, SD=1.50%).  Mean difference in non personnel spending did not 
significantly change when high school principals were presented with budget autonomy.  The 
number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 3 from 
Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. 
Table 33 
 
Summary Table of Budget Reallocation t-Tests 
 
Budget Categories Elementary Schools Middle Schools High Schools 
Teachers Total Increase (Sig) Decrease (Sig) Not Significant 
Paraprofessionals Increase (Sig) Increase (Sig) Not Significant 
Support Increase (Sig) Increase (Sig) Increase (Sig) 
Non Personnel Decrease (Sig) Not Significant Not Significant 
 
 
Across SVCS, mean spending on support personnel increased at each grade level school. 
This spending reallocation was statistically significant at each grade level.  Elementary schools, 
on average, increased their average spending levels on teachers and paraprofessionals while 
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middle and high schools decreased their average spending levels on teachers.  At all levels, on 
average, principals reallocated average spending from non personnel toward other categories, but 
this was only statistically significant at the elementary level.  The findings from RQ1 
demonstrate that there are statistically significant areas where principals, on average exercise 
budget flexibility by adjusting the budgets provided to them via central office allocations. 
Additionally, as Appendix B shows, in all cases there were multiple schools that were more than 
a standard deviation away from the mean that impact the analysis of these findings.  The 
implications of these findings will be considered further in the discussion session. 
 Research question two.  
RQ2 seeks to understand if the exercise of budget autonomy, in a distributed leadership 
environment, varies by school performance. This analysis builds on the findings from RQ1 
which indicate that budget flexibility is exercised by the average principal to varying degrees 
based on grade level and budget category. The purpose of this analysis is to compare the exercise 
of budget autonomy between high-performing and low-performing schools at SVCS. The 
hypothesis is that the two means are the same, which would indicate that spending allocations, 
on average, do not deviate from distract allocations for each budget category. 
 As mentioned earlier, SVCS schools were divided into high and low performance bands 
by comparing the CCRPI single score for 2016-17. To create a categorical variable and maintain 
sample size, schools that scored below the district median were categorized as low-performing 
and schools that scored above the median were categorized as high-performing. Since the State 
accountability calculations are different for each grade level of school, schools were sorted by 
the median score for the school level. Below is a summary table of schools included in each 
category. Since there is an odd number of schools at both middle and high school level, the 
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median school in both categories was excluded from the calculation as neither high nor low 
performing. 
Table 34 
School Performance by Grade Level in 2016-17 
School Level Median CCRPI for 
SVCS 
Number of Low 
Performing Schools 
Number of High 
Performing Schools 
Elementary 78.15 29 29 
Middle 71.10 9 9 
High 80.50 8 8 
 
 To assess whether budget flexibility is observed, each of the four budget 
categories was first separated into two groups by median performance levels. From this table, it 
becomes clearer that it is necessary to sort out performance by grade level since the medians vary 
so substantially. To ensure an appropriate cross-section of district behavior, it is important to 
represent all grade levels. Since the middle school median is almost ten points below the high 
school mean, middle schools would be dramatically underrepresented in the analysis if the 
performance by grade level was not established. The weighted average is based on the actual 
school level allocations described in Table 4. 
Table 35 
Average of Percent Absolute Value of Change in Budget by School Performance 
Budget Categories High Performing 
Schools 
Low Performing 
Schools 
All School 
Average 
Teachers  1.08% 1.81% 1.45% 
Support Personnel 5.38% 7.46% 6.44% 
Paraprofessionals 5.01% 7.30% 6.18% 
Non Personnel 16.40% 24.79% 20.69% 
Weighted Average 3.01% 4.53% 3.79% 
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Each budget category was then analyzed to identify if there is a significant change in 
spending patterns from the district allocation by performance level.  The paired samples t-test 
was used to see if the change in the means of the two groups were statistically significant. The 
independent samples t-test compares the means of two independent groups in order to determine 
whether there is statistical evidence that the means of the data sets are statistically significantly 
different (Bowen, 2016).  Since each data point is unrelated to a data point in the other data set, 
an independent approach is appropriate.  To ensure the assumption of normality was met, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test was run and the results are described in Appendix C.  In cases where the data 
was non-normal, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was also performed which agreed with the 
findings of t-test in each case as described in Appendix D.  Each analysis is provided below. 
Table 36 
 
Teacher Total, Percent Change in Budget Group 
 
Groups N Mean SD Std Error Mean  
High Performance 46 1.08% 1.35% 0.20% 
Low Performance 46 1.77% 1.78% 0.26% 
 
Table 37 
 
Teacher Total, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-Test Single 
 
 On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in 
teacher spending (M = 1.77, SE = 0.26), than high performing schools (M = 1.08, SE = 0.20).  
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The difference of 0.69 was statistically significant t (90) = -2.11, p = 0.04.  The Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of t-test.  
 
 
Table 38 
 
Paraprofessional, Percent Change in Budget Group 
 
Groups N Mean SD Std Error Mean  
High Performance 46 5.01% 8.56% 1.26% 
Low Performance 46 7.62% 16.84% 2.48% 
 
Table 39 
 
Paraprofessional, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-Test 
 
 On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in 
paraprofessional spending (M = 7.62, SE = 2.48), than high performing schools (M = 5.01, SE = 
1.26).  The difference of 2.61 was not significant t(90) = -0.94, p = 0.35.  The Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of the t-test. 
Table 40 
Support Personnel, Percent Change in Budget Group 
Groups N Mean SD Std Error Mean  
High Performance 46 5.38% 4.74% 0.70% 
Low Performance 46 7.41% 4.31% 0.64% 
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Table 41 
Support Personnel, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-Test 
 
 
 On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in 
support personnel spending (M = 7.41, SE = 0.64), than high performing schools (M = 5.38, SE 
= 0.70).  The difference of 2.03 was statistically significant t(90) = -2.15, p = 0.04.  The 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of the t-test. 
Table 42 
Non Personnel, Percent Change in Budget Group 
 
Groups N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Std Error Mean  
  
High Performance 46 16.40% 12.33% 1.82% 
  
Low Performance 46 24.89% 13.16% 1.94% 
  
 
Table 43 
Non Personnel, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-test 
 
 On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in non 
personnel spending (M = 24.89, SE = 1.94), than high performing schools (M = 16.40, SE = 
1.82).  The difference of 8.49 was significant t(90) = -3.12, p = 0.002.  The Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of t-test.  The average of low-
76 
 
performing schools represented more than a 1.5% increase in budget changes from the district 
provided allocation compared to high-performing schools in SVCS (Table 30). Specifically, in 
all four budget categories, the average low-performing schools generated budgets that reflected 
more change than the higher performing schools. This change was statistically significant in 
three of the four categories. Although low-performing schools did show an increase in spending 
on paraprofessionals, it was not statistically significant. The paraprofessionals budget category 
has the most limited budget impact of the four categories, representing about 4% of the overall 
SVCS school budget spend. 
Research question three. 
 The third research question investigates whether the exercise of budget flexibility 
increases when schools have multiple years of experience building budgets in a distributed 
leadership environment. Much of the research indicates that unfamiliarity and inexperience with 
decentralization constrains adoption (Honig, 2012). By comparing schools that have had a longer 
period of time to operate with budget autonomy with those that have just been granted this 
autonomy, it will be possible to gain more insight into whether the exercise of autonomy 
increases over time in SVCS. 
 SVCS has provided a unique opportunity to study the impact of time on the exercise of 
budget autonomy in the implementation structure that it negotiated with the state department of 
education. The district adopted a three-year phased-in approach in three cohorts, so 2016 was the 
first year of complete data.  Schools were assigned to cohorts in a fashion that was to be 
representative of the district demographics and geography. The breakout of cohort phases is 
identified below. 
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Table 44 
Number of Schools Assigned to Cohort by Year in SVCS 
Cohort Number of Schools Planning Year Implementation Year 
1 20 2013-14 2014-15 
2 37 2014-15 2015-16 
3 37 2015-16 2016-17 
 
 The first analysis of school by cohort was descriptive to determine the average amount of 
budget change by cohort. 
Table 45 
Percentage Change in Average Budget Allocation by Autonomy Implementation Cohort 
Budget Categories Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Grand Total 
Teachers Total 2.11% 1.29% 1.26% 1.45% 
Support 6.96% 5.97% 6.64% 6.44% 
Paraprofessionals 9.83% 4.36% 6.03% 6.18% 
Non Personnel 21.56% 21.28% 19.62% 20.69% 
Weighted Average Change 4.59% 3.52% 3.63% 3.79% 
 
As the table above shows, when comparing the total average change across cohorts, 
Cohort 1 changed its budget allocation by about one percent compared to Cohorts 2 and 3. This 
weighted average is based on the actual school level allocations described in Table 4. 
 To calculate whether the total budget change was statistically significant, each budget 
category was analyzed using ANOVA since there are three cohorts of data.  Each of those 
ANOVA results is listed below by budget category.  
 Since the sample size is unequal when comparing schools by implementation cohort, it 
was necessary to ensure that there is homogeneity of variance to be able to apply ANOVA 
78 
 
(Bowen, 2016). Since the p-value was greater than 0.05 in each budget category ANOVA, equal 
variances are assumed and the homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied (Bowen, 2016). 
Table 46 
Teacher Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort (Summary) 
Groups N Mean SD SE 
Cohort 1 20 2.11% 1.74% 0.39% 
Cohort 2 37 1.29% 1.44% 0.24% 
Cohort 3 37 1.26%  1.66% 0.27% 
Total 94 1.45% 1.61% 0.17% 
 
Table 47 
 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Teacher Total 
Levene’s Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
0.10  2  91 0.90 
 
 Since p > .05 we can assume the assumption of the homogeneity of variances has not 
been violated. 
Table 48 
Teacher, Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort (ANOVA) 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 10.86 2 5.43 2.14 0.12 3.10 
Within Groups 231.12 91 2.54 
   
Total 241.99 93         
Alpha = 0.05 
 
 Average teacher spending reallocations are not statistically significant by cohort since the 
F(2.14) value is below the critical value and p  > .05.  Since the Shapiro-Wilk test in Appendix C 
showed this distribution to be non-normal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed which 
agreed with the findings of ANOVA.  These Kruskal-Wallis test findings are documented in 
Appendix D.  No post hoc analysis was completed because there was no statistically significant 
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difference observed.  When given budget autonomy, the cohort analysis did not reveal 
statistically significant differences between cohorts on the teacher spending category.  
Table 49 
Paraprofessional, Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort 
(Summary) 
 
Groups N  Mean Standard Deviation  Standard Error 
Cohort 1 20  9.83% 24.03%  5.37% 
Cohort 2 37  4.36% 5.75%  0.95% 
Cohort 3 37  6.03%  10.20%  1.68% 
Total 94  6.18% 13.24%  1.37% 
 
 
Table 50 
 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Paraprofessional Total 
Levene’s Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
7.15 2  91 0.01 
 
 The p-value of the Levene’s test is less than 0.05 so it is assumed the variances are 
unequal.  Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use 
Welch's ANOVA to compares three means to see if they are equal when the data violates the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances.  In SPSS, the Welch’s output is: 
Table 51 
Welch ANOVA for Paraprofessional: Budget Percent Difference by School Level 
Welch Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
0.80 2  39.03 .46 
 
 The Welch output is not significant at the 0.05 level since p = 0.46, so there are not 
significant differences between the three school level groupings.  Since the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (0.80) was used, 
which was not significant at the .05 alpha level (p =0.46), so it can be concluded that average 
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percent change of paraprofessional spending does not differ significantly by cohort.  Since the 
Shapiro-Wilk test in Appendix C showed this distribution to be non-normal, the Kruskal-Wallis 
test was also performed which agreed with the findings of ANOVA.  These Kruskal-Wallis test 
findings are documented in Appendix D.  Since there was no statistically significant difference 
observed, no post hoc analysis was done.   
Table 52 
 
Support Personnel Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort 
(Summary) 
Groups N  Mean Standard Deviation  Standard Error 
Cohort 1 20  6.96% 4.94%  1.11% 
Cohort 2 37  5.97% 4.69%  0.77% 
Cohort 3 37  6.64% 4.38%  0.72% 
Total 94  6.44% 4.59%  0.47% 
 
Table 53 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Support Personnel 
Levene’s Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
0.60  2  91 0.555 
 
 Since p-value from Levene’s test is greater than .05, the assumption of the homogeneity 
of variances has not been violated.  Therefore, it is appropriate to use ANOVA to compare the 
means for change in spending for support personnel. 
Table 54 
Support Personnel Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort 
(ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 14.99 2 7.50 0.35 0.71 3.10 
Within Groups 1944.70 91 21.37 
   
Total 1959.70 93         
Alpha = 0.05 
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 Average support personnel spending reallocations are not statistically significant by 
cohort since the F(0.35) value is below the critical value and the p  > .05.  No post hoc analysis 
was completed because there was no statistically significant difference observed.  When given 
budget autonomy, the cohort analysis did not reveal statistically significant differences between 
cohorts on the support personnel spending category.  
 The difference between the average means for support spending were all within one 
percent and was not statistically significant per the results of the ANOVA test. Therefore, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the number of years of experience with decentralization 
significantly changed the investment in support personnel. 
Table 55 
Non Personnel, Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort 
(Summary) 
 
Groups N  Mean Standard Deviation  Standard Error 
Cohort 1 20  21.56% 14.50%  3.24% 
Cohort 2 37  21.28% 13.35%  2.19% 
Cohort 3 37  19.62% 13.05%  2.15% 
Total 94  20.69% 13.36%  1.38% 
 
Table 56 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Non Personnel Total 
Levene’s Statistic Df1  Df2 Sig. 
0.14  2  91 0.866 
 
 Since p-value from Levene’s test is greater than .05, the assumption of the homogeneity 
of variances has not been violated.  Therefore, it is appropriate to use ANOVA to compare the 
means for change in spending for non personnel. 
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Table 57 
 
Non Personnel Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort 
(ANOVA) 
 
Source of Variation SS Df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 70.37 2 35.19 0.19 0.82 3.10 
Within Groups 16548.54 91 181.75 
   
Total 16609.91 93 
 
      
 Average non personnel spending reallocations are not statistically significant by cohort 
since the F(0.19) value is below the critical value and the p  > .05.  No post hoc analysis was 
completed because there was no statistically significant difference observed.  When given budget 
autonomy, the cohort analysis did not reveal statistically significant differences between cohorts 
on the non personnel spending category. 
 The greatest amount of average budget percentage change occurred in non personnel 
spending for each cohort. While the mean changes were very close to each other, as in the 
previous cases, Cohort 1 still demonstrated the highest levels of budget changes from the district 
allocation. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the amount of years of experience with 
decentralization significantly changes the investment in non personnel. 
 In general, Cohort 1 reallocated more dollars than any other cohort for each budget 
category. However, for each budget category, these spending changes were not statistically 
different, so the null hypothesis that the means are the same cannot be rejected by this evidence. 
Hence, although Cohort 1 consistently reallocated more funds, it is not at statistically significant 
levels so it cannot be concluded that the amount of time operating in a decentralized budget 
environment leads to the greater exercise of budget autonomy. 
Summary of results. 
 All three research questions analyzed school spending from the 2016-17 school year to 
understand if principals, on average, spent their funds differently than the standard district 
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allocation. RQ1 identified, on average, schools changed more than 8.0% of their school budget in 
this decentralization initiative. The majority of budget changes were statistically significant; 
three specific findings were also practically significant. First, middle school principals were 
allocated 74.94% of their budget for teachers but shifted more than 1.1% of those funds toward 
other spending categories.  More than 20 percent of elementary schools made a change greater 
than one standard deviation from the mean.  Second, elementary school principals reduced their 
non personnel spending from 6.28% to 5.22% and shifted those funds to support other teaching 
and non-teaching adults in their building.  Third, at all levels, principals invested more resources, 
on average, in support personnel. 
 RQ2 sought to quantify the differing behavior between high and low performing schools. 
The evidence from SVCS is that low-performing schools exercise this autonomy at greater rates 
than their peers in high performing schools. High-performing schools reallocated an average of 
approximately 16% of their resources while low-performing schools changed 25% of their 
spending allocation. The percentage change in budget allocation was statistically significant for 
each budget category except for paraprofessionals, which represents a relatively small 
component of the overall allocation. 
 In the analysis of RQ3, the data shows that Cohort 1 consistently reallocated more funds 
than Cohorts 2 and 3. Cohort 1 adjusted 10.11% of their budget while Cohort 2 changed 8.22% 
and Cohort 3 altered 8.39%. However, it is not statistically significant so it cannot be concluded 
that the amount of time operating in a decentralized budget environment leads to the greater 
exercise of budget autonomy.  
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Discussion. 
 The goal of the study was to provide insight into the exercise of budget autonomy. This 
study was motivated by the desire to better understand the impact of the trend toward more 
decentralization, especially around school budgets. While decentralization efforts are on the rise, 
case after case demonstrates that local decision-making has not been affected (Goertz & Stiefel, 
1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). Specifically, principals stayed with long-standing budget practice 
and have not selected to exercise budget autonomy (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 
2012). The ultimate purpose of this study was to gather a sense of whether this strategy was 
having an impact on principal budgeting decisions by reviewing one specific district’s 
experience.  
 The study was intentionally designed to identify the activity of school leaders instead of 
stated preference. The positivist quantitative approach was required to get past intention and 
determine the actual actions taken. The study was constructed to measure average behavior 
across schools as evidenced by the actual principal allocation. Given the robust budget data set 
provided and their high degree of transparency and commitment to distributed leadership, the 
SVCS budget decentralization initiative offered a unique opportunity to observe whether 
principals exercise autonomy. As the data reveals, the picture is complex. The analysis of 
spending averages demonstrates that some principals are seizing budget autonomy while other 
groups continue to implement status quo allocations. This study has been careful to avoid 
assigning value to the exercise of budget flexibility since that is outside the scope of this 
analysis. While the efficacy of budget autonomy is undefined, there is statistically significant 
evidence that some groups embrace the budgetary aspect of decentralization reforms while others 
maintain their status quo approach.   
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Summary of implications. 
Five key implications emerged which are relevant for SVCS and districts considering 
budget decentralization.  
First, while many allocations remained the same, there is evidence that principals did 
significantly alter their budget from the district guidelines in some cases. When averaged by 
budget category, the size of these budget changes by category ranged between 1.5% and 20.7%. 
The average change across the four budget categories was 8.69%. Specifically, spending changes 
were most consistent on non personnel budget items. Teacher spending decreased, on average, at 
the middle and high school level. While this study did not explore the potential motivations, 
principals may have valued additional spending on non-teaching adults in the building instead of 
perhaps lowering class size by expanding teacher staffing levels.  
On its face, this behavior meets the stated decentralization goal of principals customizing 
their allocations to meet the needs of their communities. Without assessing the efficacy of these 
changes, it is impossible to declare the initiative a success. However, there is evidence that this 
reform had the intended behavioral outcome, specifically around elementary school principals 
which demonstrated statistically significant reallocations from non personnel spending.  
Second, the grade level of the school seems to matter. There were statistically different 
changes by grade level with middle school changes the most pronounced. The t-tests confirmed, 
in middle schools specifically, that the majority of spending categories experienced budget 
changes when principals were given the option to make changes. This finding might suggest that 
middle schools could be a useful starting point for districts to deepen their understanding of 
principal motivations. Further investigation would be required to understand why middle schools 
opt for a customized budget rather than the working with the district allocation.  
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 Third, there was a consistent reallocation from non personnel spending toward other 
budget categories. This finding suggests that this one district is likely overweighting its 
allocation in the original formulation to schools. Hence, district financial staff might consider 
reducing the original funding level for non personnel spending since the current level seems to 
be consistently too high and requires local adjustment.  
Fourth, since low-performing SVCS schools showed significantly greater exercise of 
budget autonomy, a strategy of budget autonomy holds promise to change low-performing 
school’s budget allocation behavior. SVCS’s goal of this initiative was to enable each principal 
to deploy their school resources according to their school’s unique needs (FCS Guide, 2017). 
While this exercise of flexibility may not be effective, it does suggest that in this case, the reform 
created the intended type of action. Surely if the converse were true, policymakers would have to 
reassess their implementation of a strategy designed to change behavior if the impact is a 
perpetuation of status quo decision-making. This insight is essential as districts continue to focus 
limited resources and energy on a reform strategy that may ultimately have a negligible impact 
on behavior. Reform strategies that do not have an impact may create noise and further 
distraction from the difficult work of improving teaching and learning (Honig, 2012).  
Fifth, the average school that operated in this budget decentralization for three years 
reallocated more of their budget than schools in their first two years. On average, schools in the 
first cohort of this reform reallocation about 10% of their budget while subsequent groups 
reallocated about 8% of their budget.  Though it is not statistically significant, the increase in 
reallocation by Cohort 1 schools is consistent with the distributed literature research that shows 
that knowledge of the reform is an essential criterion for success. Principals in Cohort 1, by 
virtue of their 2012 start date, participated in more annual training cycles and have experienced 
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budget autonomy for multiple years. The distributed literature suggests that leaders are more 
likely to embrace autonomy when they have the knowledge and support to take on this additional 
body of work (McKenzie & Locke, 2014).  Another explanation is that principals that are 
innately motivated to utilize this authority will immediately make changes when presented with 
the opportunity.  Since this finding was not statistically significant, further research is required to 
draw any actionable conclusion around implementation growth over time. 
Limitations of the study. 
This study utilized a non-probability sample which targets a “particular group, in the full 
knowledge that it does not represent the wider population; it simply represents itself” (Cohen et 
al., 2013, p. 113). The most direct challenge of a non-probability sample is that it is difficult to 
generalize the findings beyond the specific population examined in the study (Cohen et al., 
2013). SVCS, though relatively large, does not represent the larger population of school districts 
in the United States because it has access to the Charter System Act. A structured commitment to 
decentralization like the Charter System Act in Georgia is not found in other states, so the 
findings will not be able to be easily transferred (Badertscher, 2013). 
 Additionally, SVCS has a size and scope that limits comparisons across districts. As a 
large district in Georgia, SVCS has aspects of the other 179 districts in the state including 
schools in urban and suburban settings but does not contain schools that are rural in nature. 
SVCS’s large resource base helps it serve its uniquely substantial geographical footprint. 
Furthermore, only one year of data was addressed because of the shift in priority from the district 
leadership. Time series data might shed additional light on the exercise of autonomy, but it was 
not available at this point. 
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The replicability of these findings may also be constrained by the unique charter system 
designation available in Georgia. SVCS had made local school autonomy the centerpiece of its 
reform strategy. A critical element of the systematic decentralization in SVCS is the result of its 
designation under the Georgia Charter System Act of 2007 (Georgia Department of Education, 
2017). Without the legal structure of a decentralization contract with the state, other systems 
might not be able to compare their principal’s exercise of budget autonomy. In order to improve 
the power of these tests, all 94 schools of SVCS were included in this analysis. Power refers to 
the likelihood that this test will find a statistically significant difference when such a difference 
actually exists (Bowen, 2016). For RQ2, as a result of the reduced sample size of schools that are 
either high or low performing, power for this test was less than RQ1 which limits the strength of 
these findings. 
The ceiling effect could also be a limitation that constrains principal actions by limiting 
the amount of actual available flexibility.  The ceiling effect is a measurement limitation that 
occurs when the highest possible total or close to the highest total on a measurement instrument 
is reached, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the testing instrument has accurately measured 
the intended domain (Stam, 2010).  In this case, the measurement instrument is the principal’s 
budget allocation.  In building a budget, principals do not have unbounded budget flexibility in 
staffing allocations.  For example, every student requires to be assessed by a teacher of record, 
some custodial staff is necessary to manage the facility, special needs students have legally 
mandated teacher-student staffing ratios, and a bookkeeper is required to manage compliance 
requirements.  Hence, the amount of budget flexibility is constrained because of the ceiling 
effect, so the budget allocation measurement may not capture all of the possible flexibility a 
principal may desire to exercise. 
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This study chose to focus on four high-level budget domains, which created a trade-off 
between the level of detail of the data and the ability to make meaningful comparisons across 
categories.  Within each of the four domains (teacher, paraprofessional, support, and non- 
personnel), SVCS has dozens of additional budget lines that identify specific positions and non- 
personnel expenses.  However, including this level of detail would complicate comparisons 
because of the breadth of options and limited number of data points.  For example, there are 
more than 40 different teaching positions available to SVCS principals and 60 different support 
positions.  If a position-level analysis was used, the amount of staffing variation among schools 
would greatly reduce the ability to draw conclusions from school-level comparisons.  By 
reducing the domains to four, comparisons across domains are more meaningful, though some 
specific position level insight is not available.   
Another limitation of this sample is that it only investigated general fund dollars from 
state and property taxes. This study did not analyze categorical or special revenue sources like 
Title funds from the Federal government which have their own reporting requirements and are 
not subject to district flexibility. These represent a minority of funds in this district and are 
highly prescriptive so their allocation was not analyzed, though it likely impacts schools 
spending priorities in some cases. 
Recommendations for further research. 
Based on these limitations outlined above, future research into the exercise of budget 
autonomy may wish to adopt a case study approach of a limited number of decentralization 
initiatives to perform a qualitative investigation. Such research should draw on participants’ 
lived experiences to gain an understanding of the motivations that drive principal behavior.  
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Although this study did compare schools who have differing years of experience in building 
autonomous budget, to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of time, it would be useful to 
follow the same schools for multiple years. This approach poses a variety of challenges because 
of the regular changes in district allocations year to year, but a more narrowly focused study 
could accomplish this aim and may uncover a relationship where this study did not. 
 Another key area that was outside the scope of this study was the efficacy of budget 
autonomy. This study endeavored only to find its existence, not to assess its value. Given that 
there was a significant increase in the exercise of budget autonomy at low-performing schools at 
SVCS, future research could seek to identify if there are aspects of autonomy decisions that can 
be linked to gains in student achievement. Now that autonomy has been identified is select 
circumstances at SVCS, an important next step is to seek a connection with student achievement. 
 Conclusion. 
Decentralization has grown in popularity as district leaders are investigating strategies to 
help low-performing schools better to meet their students’ needs (Fermanich, Odden, & 
Archibald, 2000). This research study began with the assumption that, per the literature, the 
budget autonomy component of decentralization reforms remains unimplemented at the school 
level. If decentralization does not impact budget decisions at schools that are in the midst of 
reform and restructuring, then there is an opportunity to create more coherence by shifting 
attention away from budget autonomy.  
 What emerged from this study of one district operating under a distributed leadership 
model is far more nuanced. Principals at different grade levels exercised different levels of 
budget autonomy. When principals are provided flexibility, in many cases, they reallocate dollars 
from the non personnel allocation. The destination of this reallocation of dollars, however, is not 
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consistent across schools. Perhaps that is the point. Advocates of decentralization would likely 
take encouragement from this limited evidence that the availability of budget autonomy is 
impacting behavior, even though the larger impact of those changes require further investigation. 
Skeptics may note that at the secondary level, these reallocations generally moved away from 
investing in teacher staffing and more into support personnel who are not in the classroom. 
 It is the hope of this researcher that as districts pursue decentralization, they note the 
distributed leadership literature regarding the organizational requirements for change. Distributed 
leadership argues school leaders are more likely to embrace autonomy when two major attributes 
are in place: an explicit policy that defines the role of district leadership and appropriate training 
for school-based personnel now assuming new decision-making authority (Harris, 2013; Honig 
& Rainey, 2012). 
While the replicability of the findings of this study has its natural limits, there is evidence 
that principals are making different decisions that are enabled by budget autonomy at SVCS. 
This insight into the degree to which schools exercise permitted autonomy can inform the 
decentralization implementation efforts that are currently underway in district offices across the 
country.   
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
     N MEAN  STD. DEV MIN  MAX 
TT_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET 94 69.4323% 4.56887% 50.46% 77.51% 
TT_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET  94 69.3498% 4.59090% 48.91% 77.43% 
PP_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET 94 4.9950%  2.47891% 0.86% 11.19% 
PP_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET  94 5.1707%  2.56405% 0.86% 11.19% 
SUPPORT_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGT 94 18.9458% 3.70386% 13.75% 39.46% 
SUPPORT_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET 94 19.7192% 4.27758% 13.17% 41.65% 
NP_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET 94 6.6270%  1.54523% 4.92% 13.25% 
NP_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET  94 5.7603%  1.723898% 2.72% 10.90%   
TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)  20 2.1052%  1.73963% 0.00% 5.57% 
TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)  37 1.2613%  1.66190% 0.00% 5.79% 
TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)  37 1.2890%  1.43561% 0.00% 4.94% 
PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)  20 9.8296%  24.02905% 0.00% 100.00% 
PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)  37 4.3577%  5.75467% 0.00% 20.00% 
PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)  37 6.0261%  10.20357% 0.00% 40.00% 
SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS) 20 6.9572%  4.94235% 0.07% 17.27% 
SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS) 37 5.9703%  4.68503% 0.07% 20.18% 
SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS) 37 6.6401%  4.37929% 0.00% 23.06% 
NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)  20 21.5597% 14.50185% 0.36% 48.31% 
NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)  37 21.2792% 13.34707% 0.29% 54.66% 
NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)  37 19.6195% 13.04967% 0.00% 56.88% 
TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)  46 1.0758%  1.35230% 0.00% 4.15% 
TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)  46 1.7745%  1.79711% 0.00% 5.79% 
PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)  46 5.0068%  8.56033% 0.00% 38.46% 
PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)  46 7.6191%  16.84462% 0.00% 100.00% 
SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS) 46 5.3785%  4.74399% 0.00% 23.06% 
SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS) 46 7.4075%  4.31282% 0.29% 20.18% 
NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)  46 16.4039% 12.32776% 0.00% 48.31% 
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NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)  46 24.8947% 13.15965% 0.02% 56.88%  
  
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
TT   TEACHER TOTAL BUDGET 
PP   PARAPROFESSIONAL BUDGET 
SUPPORT   SUPPORT PERSONNEL BUDGET 
NP    NON PERSONNEL BUDGET 
C1    COHORT 1 
C2    COHORT 2 
C3    COHORT 3 
HP    HIGH PERFORMING SCHOOLS 
LP    LOW PERFORMING SCHOOLS 
ABS   ABSOLUTE VALUE 
 
NOTE: THE PARAPROFESSIONAL CATEGORY MAY HAVE A MINIMUM OF 0% AND A MAXIMUM OF 100% 
BECAUSE NO CEILING EFFECT APPLIES TO PARAPROFESSIONALS.  SCHOOLS DO NOT HAVE A REQUIREMENT 
TO KEEP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PARAPROFESSIONALS IN THEIR SCHOOL SO ALL OF THESE POSITONS CAN 
BE REALLOCATED TO OTHER BUDGET LINES.  
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR BUDGET CHANGE PERCENTAGE BY DOMAIN 
Budget Category  
Level 
Summary Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max N > Mean + SD 
        
Teachers ES 0.81% 58 1.15% 0.00% 4.15% 12 
Teachers MS 2.28% 19 1.89% 0.00% 5.57% 5 
Teachers HS 2.70% 17 1.55% 0.10% 5.79% 2 
Paraprofessionals ES 4.13% 58 6.05% 0.00% 24.19% 11 
Paraprofessionals MS 11.58% 19 24.66% 0.00% 100.00% 2 
Paraprofessionals HS 7.13% 17 12.41% 0.00% 38.46% 3 
Support Personnel ES 5.68% 58 3.95% 0.00% 15.05% 4 
Support Personnel MS 9.21% 19 6.40% 0.29% 23.06% 4 
Support Personnel HS 5.96% 17 3.04% 1.99% 11.25% 4 
Non Personnel ES 21.67% 58 14.18% 0.00% 56.88% 9 
Non Personnel MS 20.28% 19 11.57% 0.02% 42.38% 4 
Non Personnel HS 17.79% 17 12.59% 0.36% 45.10% 3 
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APPENDIX C:  
 
TESTS OF NORMALITY 
 
 
Level 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic Df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TT_BudgetChange% ES .305 58 .000 .828 58 .000 
HS .129 17 .200* .955 17 .534 
MS .150 19 .200* .958 19 .530 
PP_BudgetChange% ES .357 58 .000 .777 58 .000 
HS .376 17 .000 .766 17 .001 
MS .365 19 .000 .551 19 .000 
NP_BudgetChange% ES .084 58 .200* .979 58 .429 
HS .172 17 .196 .928 17 .203 
MS .156 19 .200* .943 19 .294 
 
Support_BudgetChange% ES .110 58 .078 .958 58 .043 
HS .126 17 .200* .935 17 .265 
MS .117 19 .200* .963 19 .628 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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Level 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TT_Earned % of School Budget ES .090 58 .200* .971 58 .188 
HS .228 17 .019 .795 17 .002 
MS .092 19 .200* .950 19 .400 
TT_Used % of School Budget ES .091 58 .200* .971 58 .181 
HS .326 17 .000 .662 17 .000 
MS .179 19 .110 .922 19 .126 
PP_Earned % of School Budget ES .063 58 .200* .959 58 .046 
HS .234 17 .014 .788 17 .001 
MS .187 19 .080 .884 19 .026 
PP_Used % of School Budget ES .093 58 .200* .951 58 .020 
HS .219 17 .029 .743 17 .000 
MS .150 19 .200* .916 19 .094 
Support_Earned % of School Budget ES .139 58 .007 .897 58 .000 
HS .364 17 .000 .607 17 .000 
MS .122 19 .200* .942 19 .284 
Support_Used % of School Budget ES .118 58 .043 .933 58 .003 
HS .369 17 .000 .672 17 .000 
MS .171 19 .146 .927 19 .154 
NP_Earned % of School Budget ES .143 58 .005 .830 58 .000 
HS .260 17 .003 .878 17 .029 
MS .146 19 .200* .934 19 .208 
NP_Used % of School Budget ES .053 58 .200* .992 58 .961 
HS .162 17 .200* .965 17 .725 
MS .146 19 .200* .938 19 .239 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.  
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Performance Level  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TT_Earned % of School Budget 1 = High Performance .167 46 .003 .911 46 .002 
2 = Low Performance .120 46 .094 .873 46 .000 
TT_Used % of School Budget 1 = High Performance .105 46 .200* .961 46 .124 
2 = Low Performance .115 46 .157 .842 46 .000 
PP_Earned % of School Budget 1 = High Performance .177 46 .001 .876 46 .000 
2 = Low Performance .100 46 .200* .959 46 .109 
PP_Used % of School Budget 1 = High Performance .163 46 .003 .888 46 .000 
2 = Low Performance .128 46 .057 .944 46 .027 
Support_Earned % of School 
Budget 
1 = High Performance .151 46 .011 .904 46 .001 
2 = Low Performance .201 46 .000 .753 46 .000 
Support_Used % of School 
Budget 
1 = High Performance .102 46 .200* .932 46 .010 
2 = Low Performance .146 46 .015 .790 46 .000 
NP_Earned % of School Budget 1 = High Performance .191 46 .000 .783 46 .000 
2 = Low Performance .271 46 .000 .720 46 .000 
NP_Used % of School Budget 1 = High Performance .122 46 .086 .972 46 .338 
2 = Low Performance .148 46 .013 .915 46 .002 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
  
Cohort 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TT_Earned % of School Budget 1 .143 20 .200* .949 20 .353 
2 .085 37 .200* .981 37 .764 
3 .178 37 .005 .859 37 .000 
TT_Used % of School Budget 1 .125 20 .200* .963 20 .609 
2 .114 37 .200* .960 37 .208 
3 .173 37 .007 .817 37 .000 
PP_Earned % of School Budget 1 .162 20 .177 .907 20 .055 
2 .111 37 .200* .935 37 .033 
3 .158 37 .021 .912 37 .006 
PP_Used % of School Budget 1 .123 20 .200* .928 20 .144 
2 .137 37 .075 .932 37 .025 
3 .179 37 .004 .902 37 .003 
Support_Earned % of School 
Budget 
1 .153 20 .200* .949 20 .349 
2 .171 37 .008 .921 37 .012 
3 .216 37 .000 .683 37 .000 
Support_Used % of School 
Budget 
1 .102 20 .200* .961 20 .564 
2 .152 37 .030 .947 37 .078 
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3 .203 37 .001 .722 37 .000 
NP_Earned % of School Budget 1 .309 20 .000 .693 20 .000 
2 .188 37 .002 .803 37 .000 
3 .238 37 .000 .797 37 .000 
NP_Used % of School Budget 1 .154 20 .200* .919 20 .094 
2 .098 37 .200* .968 37 .356 
3 .115 37 .200* .962 37 .235 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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APPENDIX D 
NON PARAMETRIC TEST FINDINGS 
 
Comparison of Teacher Spending Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, High School 
 
 
Comparison of Paraprofessionals Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Elementary School 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
PP_Earned % of School Budget_ES and 
PP_Used % of School Budget_ES equals 0. 
Related-Samples 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.000 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 58 
Test Statistic 720.000 
Standard Error 77.170 
Standardized Test Statistic 3.751 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .000 
 
Comparison of Paraprofessionals Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Middle School 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
PP_Earned % of School Budget_MS and 
PP_Used % of School Budget_MS equals 0. 
Related-Samples 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.005 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 19 
Test Statistic 86.000 
Standard Error 14.309 
Standardized Test Statistic 2.830 
/Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .005 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
TT_Earned % of School Budget_HS and 
TT_Used % of School Budget_HS equals 0. 
Related-Samples 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.407 Retain the null 
hypothesis. 
Total N 17 
Test Statistic 59.000 
Standard Error 21.125 
Standardized Test Statistic -.828 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .407 
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Comparison of Paraprofessionals Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, High School 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
PP_Earned % of School Budget_HS and 
PP_Used % of School Budget_HS equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test 
.754 Retain the null hypothesis. 
Total N 17 
Test Statistic 35.000 
Standard Error 12.748 
Standardized Test Statistic -.314 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .754 
 
Comparison of Support Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Elementary School 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
Support_Earned % of School Budget_ES and 
Support_Used % of School Budget_ES 
equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.002 Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Total N 58 
Test Statistic 1174.000 
Standard Error 122.593 
Standardized Test Statistic 3.067 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .002 
 
Comparison of Support Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, High School 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
Support_Earned % of School Budget_HS 
and Support_Used % of School 
Budget_HS equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.003 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 17 
Test Statistic 139.000 
Standard Error 21.125 
Standardized Test Statistic 2.959 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .003 
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Comparison of Non Personnel Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Elementary School 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
NP_Earned % of School Budget_ES and 
NP_Used % of School Budget_ES equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.000 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 58 
Test Statistic 182.000 
Standard Error 122.593 
Standardized Test Statistic -5.025 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .000 
 
Comparison of Teacher Spending for High and Low Performing Schools  
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
TT_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and 
TT_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.047 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 46 
Test Statistic 558.000 
Standard Error 74.398 
Standardized Test Statistic 1.989 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .047 
 
Comparison of Paraprofessional Spending for High and Low Performing Schools  
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
PP_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and 
PP_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.567 Retain the null hypothesis. 
Total N 46 
Test Statistic 244.000 
Standard Error 46.247 
Standardized Test Statistic .573 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .567 
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Comparison of Support Spending for High and Low Performing Schools  
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
Support_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and 
Support_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) 
equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.045 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 46 
Test Statistic 724.000 
Standard Error 91.530 
Standardized Test Statistic 2.005 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .045 
 
Comparison of Non Personnel Spending for High and Low Performing Schools  
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The median of differences between 
NP_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and 
NP_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) equals 0. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
.001 Reject the null hypothesis. 
Total N 46 
Test Statistic 846.000 
Standard Error 91.530 
Standardized Test Statistic 3.338 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .001 
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Comparison of Percent Change in Budget for Teacher Spending Across Implementation Cohorts 
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The distribution of TT_BudgetChange% 
(ABS) is the same across categories of 
Cohort (1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15). 
Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
.116 Retain the null hypothesis. 
Total N 94 
Test Statistic 4.305 
Degree Of Freedom 2 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .116 
 
 
Comparison of Percent Change in Budget for Paraprofessional Spending Across Implementation 
Cohorts 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The distribution of PP_BudgetChange% 
(ABS) is the same across categories of 
Cohort (1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15). 
Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
.864 Retain the null hypothesis. 
Total N 94 
Test Statistic .291 
Degree Of Freedom 2 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .864 
 
Comparison of Means of Percent Change in Budget for Support Spending Across 
Implementation Cohorts 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The distribution of 
Support_BudgetChange% (ABS) is the 
same across categories of Cohort 
(1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15). 
Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
.584 Retain the null hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .050. 
 
Total N 94 
Test Statistic 1.077 
Degree Of Freedom 2 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .584 
107 
 
Comparison of Percent Change in Budget for Non Personnel Spending Across Implementation 
Cohorts 
 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The distribution of NP_BudgetChange% 
(ABS) is the same across categories of 
Cohort (1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15). 
Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
.810 
 
Retain the null hypothesis. 
Total N 94 
Test Statistic .422 
Degree Of Freedom 2 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .810 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
